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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
 
 Introduction  1.1
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is perhaps one of the most contentious policies 
endorsed by the ANC-led South African government. With far-reaching objectives, the policy 
is seen as an important concept in discussions about South Africa’s development and public 
policy discourse. Central to these goals is the advancement and increased participation of 
black people in the economy, as highlighted in the Broad-Based Black Empowerment (B-
BBEE) Act of 2003. The later inclusion of the term ‘broad-based’ in the initiative was a 
means to emphasise that BEE was non-elitist, but rather aimed at the establishment of 
broader socio-economic justice and transformation. The South African government has 
therefore argued that the promotion of B-BBEE in the workplace is a vehicle to implement 
transformative changes that would result in the advancement of several black people (Public 
Works, 2006).  
However as an instrument that seeks to effect change in the South African social and 
economic landscape, its definition and interpretation remain slippery, subsequently resulting 
in a lack of clarity on the effectiveness of its application in the private sector. Prompted by 
the numerous anecdotal presentations that seek to create a better understanding of BEE in 
South Africa, I found it necessary to conduct a study that would inform one of how this public 
policy instrument is implemented, as well as how it has impacted the strategic approach of a 
segment of the private sector.  
This dissertation thus seeks to critically investigate, examine and describe how four large 
South African construction companies1 have responded to and engaged with Black 
Economic Empowerment. Using these companies as a case study, namely, Murray & 
Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read, the paper will highlight the extent to which 
BEE implementation has been effective in so far as meeting its objectives as articulated in 
the scorecard. The scorecard used is embedded in the Construction Sector Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Charter (CSC). Moreover, the study discusses the strategic 
changes undergone by each of the firms over a twenty year period (1994-2014) in their 
efforts to comply with the policy, while remaining profitable and sustainable. Additionally, 
through an evaluation of these corporate strategies and various growth paths, the paper 
aims to articulate the approaches employed by each company in the face of a reformed 
                                                             
1 The words ‘company/companies’, ‘firm/firms’, ‘business/businesses’, ‘enterprise/enterprises’ are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
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political environment, assessing the common tendencies displayed in the industry. The 
paper consequently seeks to fill in the gaps in literature with regards to the strategies that 
large companies in the construction industry have gradually adapted in order to continue 
operating in a democratic South Africa. Thus, through its investigations, it addresses how 
and why; (1) industry designed and adapted its corporate strategies to fit the institutional 
arrangements of BEE, (2), how the industry has responded and implemented BEE, and (3) 
how the industry has influenced the policy.  
 
 Problem Statement and Research Question 1.2
 
This research paper seeks to discuss the manner in which four of South Africa’s large 
construction companies have responded to BEE policy though highlighting the changes in 
their corporate strategies as well as their engagement with the construction sector 
scorecard. Moreover, it describes the B-BBEE policy in detail and how it was applied to the 
construction industry.  In doing so, the paper will answer the following question: How have 
four large South African construction companies strategically responded to transformation 
targets placed by the establishment of BEE policy? Examine from 1994-2014. 
By interrogating this question, this paper hopes to show that BEE policy is a dominant 
feature in the strategic landscape of these companies, due to the high proportion of public 
sector clients in the construction industry.   
 
 Significance of Study 1.3
 
The construction sector is especially useful in examining the effectiveness of BEE 
implementation. This is mainly because of the high volume of business that flows from 
government to industry (with the government’s need for a functional construction industry to 
meet reconstruction/infrastructure goals) that necessitates a committed relationship between 
the two parties. Moreover, construction creates an economic ripple effect and aids socio-
economic development. With infrastructural development along with the empowerment and 
advancement of the previously disadvantaged being a high priority for the ANC-led 
government, the relationship between the state and big players in the industry has important 
implications for the overall growth path of the sector. Public works in areas such as housing 
delivery, transportation systems, hospitals and stadia have a direct impact on development. 
The erection of office buildings, factories, malls and hotels further illustrates that construction 
serves a critical link to skills development, job creation and service delivery while 
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simultaneously showing that private sector construction is also another major contributor 
towards development. 
Hence, in light of the prominent economic position that the construction industry holds in 
South Africa, a clear understanding of the companies’ response to BEE and why they have 
chosen various paths is essential in attaining a better understanding of how large corporates 
have interacted with BEE/B-BBEE policy along with its scorecard.  
Moreover, the study aims to add value to the limited body of knowledge that deals with the 
impacts and effects that BEE policy has had on predominantly white, large South African 
companies who seek to continue operating in the domestic market.   
 
 Research Methodology 1.4
 
The broader drive of this dissertation is to determine business-state arrangements in 
South Africa and whether these are working to the benefit of a transformed makeup of South 
Africa’s corporate sector. Taking such an analysis a level lower, the focus is then on the 
construction sector. The aim remains to determine that indeed the industry has been highly 
responsive to BEE pressures, taking the implementation of BEE policy seriously through 
adjusting their corporate strategies accordingly. 
Research has included multiple types of sources that are of a qualitative nature, to support 
this industry-level hypothesis. Firstly, through a literature review, a contextual perspective of 
BEE policy and the construction industry is discussed. Using quantitative data and various 
reports from the companies, the corporate strategies during the evaluated period were 
investigated. 
The research methodology was largely through a desktop-based study, which included data 
from publically available information. Primary data has consisted of the annual reports over 
the period 1994 to 2014 for all the firms, as well as information from numerous media 
releases, websites, journal articles as well as publicised articles.  
An analytical template was constructed to organise the data in a clear, concise and 
systematic manner. The template merely divided the data into six sections that would 
become the sections of this paper. A series of charts, tables and figures were constructed 
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 Chapter Outline  1.5
 
The chapters are set out as follows; 
Through a literature review format, chapter two begins by providing an overview of BEE 
policy in South Africa. This is followed by a historical outline of the South African 
construction industry as well as an examination of the key bodies in the sector in chapter 
three. 
Chapter four focuses on the key features of the construction sector B-BBEE charter and 
scorecard. The chapter discusses some of the individuals who shaped the charter and thus 
dictated how industry engages with empowerment and transformation. 
Chapter five examines the trends of BEE policy implementation within the four leading firms. 
This chapter begins the empirical analysis of the paper by firstly discussing the history of 
each the four major players that are the case study for this paper. It further discusses the 
early BEE transactions as well as the inclusion of black elites onto company boards as steps 
taken to implement BEE by the firms. Moreover, this chapter analyses the scores obtained 
by each firm in their efforts to comply with the sector charter. 
The sixth chapter discusses the corporate strategies and performances of the firms over 
three time periods in seeking to understand why strategies were set and altered according to 
the anticipated programmes promised to be rolled out by the state. The quest here is to 
investigate whether a key component of these companies’ BEE strategy has been an 
incorporation of transformation as a business imperative and not merely as a compliance 
requirement, largely because of their continued dependence on public sector contracting.   
The last chapter includes recommendations on the ways forward for the companies and 
predictions on how the relationship between these private sector players and the state 
through BEE policy will unfold over the years. Additionally, the chapter concludes and 
summarizes the paper. 
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Chapter 2: The history and evolution of 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in 
South Africa  
 
 Introduction and Chapter Outline  2.1
 
This chapter aims to give the background and motivation of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) policy in South Africa, particularly contextualizing it in light of South 
Africa’s oppressive apartheid history and detailing its relevance in South Africa. The section 
then describes two approaches to BEE as documented by Gqubule (2006), namely the 
minimalist and maximalist approach, which aid in the attempt to clearly define BEE. The 
chapter seeks to give a detailed review of BEE, its history and the drivers that eventually led 
to the dismantling of BEE towards the development of a grander framework, known as the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act. This chapter is shaped around 
synthesising literature on BEE/B-BBEE locating the policies within the wider narrative of 
South Africa’s development trajectory that sees this policy framework as a bridge between 
business and state. 
 
  An Overview of the Historical Context leading to BEE 2.2
 
South Africa remains one of the very few countries in the globe to exit a period of 
discrimination, turmoil and violent segregation without the extreme use of force, violence or 
even the outbreak of a civil war. It is a nation characterised by the triumph of the human 
spirit through Ubuntu and a transition process that was able to facilitate a stable state. Part 
of the discussions in 1994 were questions around how a black majority that faced 
discrimination against under colonialism, slavery and apartheid rule would be integrated into 
the mainstream economy and become active participants in it. Attempting to rectify the 
centuries of oppression would undoubtedly be a long process. Hence, it was (and remains) 
necessary for policies aimed at doing so to be effective, efficient and impactful.  
Although these past injustices are perhaps the most obvious and prevalent factors 
contributing to initiating transformative policies in a democratic South Africa, political 
economy considerations, as well as economic inefficiencies, are also worthy to be noted. As 
argued by Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson (2007) basic economic theory suggests that there 
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are potentially big productivity benefits gained from overcoming the misallocation of human 
and physical capital. The logic behind such an assertion is the understanding that apartheid 
left behind a mismatch between the distribution of ownership of assets and the abilities of 
those that can use them after liberation (Acemoglu et al, 2007). The significance of 
empowering black people in all spheres of South Africa therefore lies in the fact that the 
systematically designed oppressive vehicle that was apartheid aimed to ensure that the 
drivers and beneficiaries of wealth, progress and success in South Africa would never be 
black. One ought to, therefore, comprehend that all government work pre-1994 successfully 
worked together in bringing about discriminatory public policies that were used to achieve 
the goal of economically uplifting the white minority while purposefully oppressing the black 
majority. Such policies include: 
 Preferential access to public sector procurement as well as other government favours 
to Afrikaner-owned businesses 
 Labour legislation that restricted skilled blue-collar employment to white workers 
 An unequal education system that systematically attempted to prepare black youth 
for the unskilled labour market 
Based on this understanding one can argue on both positive and normative grounds that the 
redistribution of assets and affirmative action are socially efficient policies. 
There have been significant steps taken towards transformation in democratic South Africa 
over the past 21 years; however the country remains characterised by racially based income 
disparities and severe social service inequalities. Not only is this unjust, but it acts as 
barriers that prevent South Africa from achieving its full economic potential. Moreover, the 
centuries of political, legal, economic and social disempowerment has made it complex and 
overwhelming to find best practice methods that could apply to the South African case. This 
then implies that although South African could “borrow” from similar cases across the globe - 
particularly the newly decolonised successes - its processes would be fundamentally 
different as it pursued a more racially inclusive way forward where the oppressed would 
work with the former ‘enemy’ in rebuilding a new society. Dealing with the legacy of 
apartheid consequently required direct intervention in the distribution of assets and 
opportunities that would unlock doors that were closed to the black majority. 
The negotiated settlement essentially secured the ANC political power, while simultaneously 
accepting the principles of a market economy. This largely resulted in significant 
compromises for the advancement of blacks and thus the role of the private sector became 
pivotal in the plight of equality and justice. From as early as the mid-1980s, before the 
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beginning of any transition process, ‘big business’ had begun looking for accommodation 
within the ANC through a series of meetings in Lusaka and Geneva (Southall, 2006). By the 
early 1990s, with negotiations in place the ANC had ‘warmed-up’ to adopting more market-
friendly macroeconomic policies in response to not only the global context2, but also 
accepting the idea that the use of state power to assert for black ownership and control in 
the private sector was in line with its theory of National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and 
thus, its decolonising principles (Tangri and Southall, 2008). Therefore by 1996, the ANC 
had shifted from its 1994 election manifesto placard and people driven Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy 
(GEAR) that became its strategic framework in 1996 (Randall, 1996; Habib and 
Padayachee, 2006; Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert, 2007). GEAR entangled with it a push for 
‘big business’ to increase the number of black managers and board members, rapidly 
making room for black capitalists in their ownership structures as well as expanding black-
owned businesses. 
Hence, prior to 1997, the economic empowerment of blacks was an informal post-apartheid 
project that saw large white corporations and conglomerates unbundle and dispose their 
non-core assets, selling these to a handful of upcoming black elites, usually those with some 
political clout (Randall, 1996; Southall, 2006; Tangri and Southall, 2008). 
 The Creation of Black Empowerment Policy  2.3
 
For clarity and understanding, it is useful to divide the timeline of the BEE trajectory 
into two types; first, is the private sector led, unguided and sporadic initiatives of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Second are the government led initiatives of the formalization and 
institutionalization of the concept through public policy and institutional mechanisms such as 
the establishment of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission in 1997.  
  
The first strand of BEE was marked by collective and individual tactics characterized by, first 
(the collective tactic) black- owned finance through stokvels (rotating savings and investment 
in existing and new assets). Secondly was the  (individual tactic) transfer of some assets 
from white business to the very small group of established black entrepreneurs (Gelb, 2004). 
The acknowledgement of black business development agencies such as, Nafcoc (National 
Federated Chamber of Commerce), Fabcos (Foundation for African Business and Consumer 
Services), Nasasa (National Stokvel Association of South Africa) and Business Challenge is 
                                                             
2 The Soviet Union had collapsed in 1990, which resulted in a fundamental change in the international landscape as the 
world moved towards capitalist economics.  
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made under the first tactic as they also played a crucial role in the definition of BEE in its 
inchoate stages (Mabeta, 1991). This “first phase of black empowerment’” as Southall (2006) 
has articulated, saw board appointments and share transfers being conducted at some of 
the country’s biggest enterprises, one such deal leading to the establishment of the country’s 
first black company listed on the JSE in 19953.  Consequently, one finds that across all 
sectors the structure of the first phase of BEE were deals involving white companies selling 
portions of their unissued equity to a few pre-identified black purchasers 4 (Acemoglu et al, 
2007). In most cases this equity was issued at below the market price depending on the 
firm’s structure and equity availability. This gave rise to controversies that considered the 
entire process as a form of fronting. 
 
The first type of BEE can be viewed as a “bottom-up” tactic where the goal of black 
economic empowerment was taken as to assist and accelerate the appearance of a non-
racial representative government in South Africa. According to Browning (1989) the 
commonly accepted theme was that if black people, both as a collective and individuals 
could become more prosperous, that very fact would enable the process of political change 
to take place more quickly. Engdahl and Hauki (2001) argue that in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, white business regarded black economic empowerment as a mechanism to create a 
black middle class with interests in the economy. The idea behind this was that by partly re-
arranging the racial composition of the ownership structure, this would assist in ensuring a 
market economy and political stability.  
 
What one can infer from this is that a few sectors of capital had concluded that apartheid no 
longer made economic sense and was no longer good for business, particularly with regards 
to the new prospects brought by the international economy. As argued by Browning (1989) 
Black economic empowerment, in this first type, “could be viewed as having a ‘trickle up’ 
effect, transforming government from below upwards”. After 1994, this tactic developed into 
a means of appeasing the new government. The response from corporate South Africa, 
when the ANC came into power, was the appointment of black non-executive directors and 
selling businesses to black empowerment groups (Engdahl and Hauki, 2001; Tangri and 
Southall, 2008). Furthermore, financial institutions provided funding through ‘Special 
Purpose Vehicles’ (SPVs), enabling black people without capital to go into business as well 
as aiding black business in purchasing shares in white companies. 
                                                             
33 Led by Dr Nthato Motlana, the New Africa Investment Ltd (NAIL) became the first black company to be listed on the JSE. 
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) facilitated the R137 million acquisition by these back investors of a 10% stake 
in Metropolitan Life, from Sanlam.    
4 This is an assertion to be tackled in the deep company analysis later in the paper. 
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The second part of the timeline indicates the second type of BEE trickled from the “top 
down”. Its tenure is marked by the formalization and institutionalization of the BEE concept 
through, among other things, the enactment of the B-BBEE Act of 2003 as well as its 
provisions such as the Codes of Good Practice and the Empowerment Charters (DTI, 2004). 
The period from 1997-2003 is integral to the making of BEE policy, as negotiations were 
held and sector charters established. Detailed in the timeline below are the key ‘events’ that 




Figure 1: BEE Timeline 
YEAR EVENT 




- BEECom was formally introduced under the Black Business Council 
umbrella 
 
- Capture of black emerging elites by white capital 
 
1999 
Thabo Mbeki furthers the ideals of an African Renaissance and 
emphasizes the making of a black bourgeoisie/ black capitalist class5 
 
2000 




BEECom releases its final report, recommending greater government 





-State begins forcing the pace of empowerment7 
 
-Speedy process of empowerment begins to alienate established white 
business8 
                                                             
5 In a speech to the Black Management Forum in November 1999, Mbeki makes the call for a “‘black bourgeoisie whose 
presence within our economy ... will be part of the process of the deracialisation of the economy”. He further adds that this 
will “promote the interests of the disadvantaged black majority through job creation and skills development.” (Tangri and 
Southall, 2008) 
6 This initial report emphasises the importance of both ownership and control in the entire empowerment discourse 
7 Acting on the pressures from black business about the slow movement of black empowerment , government is made to 
take up a position in the advancement of black empowerment 
8 “Established white business grew alarmed about the possibility of greater government intervention in the world of capital. In 
May 2001, the mainly white South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) even questioned the wisdom of empowerment 
legislation saying the markets would not tolerate it.” (Tangri and Southall, 2008) 
 








-Leak of the draft mining charter causes havoc in the stock market9 
 
-Truce was reached when Mbeki administration commits to drawing up 





-BEE Strategy document was released in March  
 
-Agreement among stakeholders that BEE be more broad-based – not 
just about ownership quotas and the transfer of corporate assets to 
wealthy black elite 
2004  B-BBEE Act was promulgated in April, in line with 2003 policy document 
 
Public Works Minister, Stella Sigcau launches the construction sector 




A committee for the establishment of the Codes of Good Practice on 
BEE is assembled and headed up Philisiwe Buthelezi 
 
The birth of this era is marked by a desire by a group of emerging black elites to formalise 
better and avoid fronting in empowerment practises. The idea of Black Economic 
Empowerment was therefore first conceptualised in a Black Management Forum (BMF) 
meeting held in Stellenbosch in 1997. The meeting, which took place from 14-15 November 
1997,  initially gave rise to what was then named the BEE Commission (BEECom) with the 
view that black people should direct and take charge of a new vision for their economic 
empowerment, a process that, until then, had been conceptualised, controlled and driven by 
the private sector, as previously mentioned. Following the meeting, the BEECom was 
formally established in May 1998 under the auspices of the Black Business Council (BBC), 
an umbrella body representing 11 black business organisations. The BEECom stated that its 
aim was to facilitate the capital of black people into business, by creating state policies that 
would directly serve this goal. Together with its first chairperson, Cyril Ramaphosa11, the 
commission pledged and dedicated itself to the transformation of the private sector, 
particularly in majorly white dominated industries. 
The Commission also called for” greater government intervention to give impetus to 
economic empowerment” (Ponte, Roberts and Sittert, 2007; Tangri and Southall, 2008). 
                                                             
9 The government’s empowerment proposal for the mining sector, which was leaked on 19 July 2002 provoked a major fall 
in the JSE (Tangri and Southall, 2008). R56 billion was wiped off the value of South Africa’s mining stocks as “international 
investors reacted adversely to the draft charter’s statement that black ownership in the mining sector should amount to 51%” 
(Joffe, 2005; Ponte, Roberts and Sittert, 2007).  
10 Discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
11 Cyril Ramaphosa a former trade unionist, turned business mogul. He is currently the Deputy President of the Republic of 
South Africa.  
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Thus, in 2001, there was a demand from black business to government that they take 
greater steps towards transformation while white capital argues that the markets would be 
unable to tolerate any empowerment legislation. As illustrated in the timeline, it is in 2002 - 
following the havoc caused by the leaked draft mining charter on the financial market – that 
government decides to revisit issues about empowerment, subsequently committing itself to 
lead the development of a BEE strategy. Government vowed to work alongside big business 
to come to “mutually acceptable solutions” (Tangri and Southall, 2008). After lengthy 
consultation with the DTI and private sector stakeholders came the release of the official 
BEE strategy document in 2003, which was followed by the legislation of the B-BBEE 
Act.Following the enactment of the Act came the emergence of non-governmental agencies 
aimed at verifying and evaluating B-BBEE credentials of companies.  
 
  The Approaches to and Narratives for BEE   2.4
 
Gqubule (2006) argues that two dominant approaches subsequently emerged over 
the forming years of BEE. The two strands of BEE discussed above are to be understood 
along the lines of the minimalist versus the maximalist approach to economic empowerment. 
The first is the minimalist approach that equates BEE to the development of a patriotic 
bourgeoisie of black managers and entrepreneurs. In brief, the minimalist approach as 
defined by Edigheji (1999) is one which “emphasises a proportional representation of 
previously marginalised groups of people in the public and private sector”. It seeks to alter 
the racial composition of privileges and exploitations to create a new circuit of  racial capital 
accumulation. A minimalist approach tends to promote the empowerment of a few black 
individuals and the disempowerment of the majority of the black population who do not have 
access to the new circuit of racial accumulation (Adam, Slabbert and Moodley, 1997).  
 
On the other hand is the maximalist approach which is said to be all encompassing of a 
greater deal of factors as it aims to promote democratisation and transformation of 
institutions, as opposed to the mere inclusion of a few individuals from the formerly 
oppressed demographics into ownership and managerial positions (Edigheji, 1999). The 
approach is said to be about improving the position of black people, in particular, women, 
through measures that ensure a more equitable overall distribution of assets and income. 
This broader national empowerment strategy is one that includes broad-based redistributive 
strategies such as land reform, job creation, rural development, urban renewal, poverty 
alleviation, black women empowerment, skills and educational training as well as the 
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reprioritisation of government services. From these approaches, come three narratives that 
better describe BEE, with the first two being of core focus in this dissertation.  
 
2.4.1 The First Narrative  
 
The first narrative focuses BEE discourse and practice on the career mobility/advancement 
of black managerial, professional and business ranks, comprising of a group of small, new 
elites and is largely in alignment with a minimalist approach. This narrative also 
encompasses seeing BEE in terms of the creation of a black business class, where black 
people can acquire share certificates in previously white companies or secure government 
tenders and an equity stake in government initiated business through licensing and 
privatisation (Gqubule, 2006). As argued by Edigheji (1999), perhaps the biggest limitation of 
this first narrative is that it restricts the black majority to become spectators of fellow minority 
blacks, who have succeeded in their communities and are thus to be admired and 
celebrated. The success of these black individuals or companies is to give a psychological 
boost to the black community, inspiring and motivating them to engage in “productive socio-
economic activities” dispelling the impression that success in business is a purely white 
phenomenon (Gqubule, 2006 and Butler, 2007).  
During the years leading up to the legislation of B-BBEE in 2003, it is precisely in the manner 
described above that corporate South Africa responded and approached the transformation 
agenda. From 1998, there is an insurgence of large companies from across all dominant 
sectors as they rush to capture South Africa’s emerging black capitalist elites with political 
clout (Randall, 1996; Edigheji, 2000; Chabane, Goldstein and Roberts, 2006; Tangri and 
Southall, 2007). This period is known for the marriage of white partners who brought with 
them monetary capital and aspiring black capitals who delivered political capital. Individuals 
such as Saki Macozoma who took up a seat on the board of Murray & Roberts are among 
those noted as the main beneficiaries of this period. With this came a lot of scrutinies as 
analysis pointed out that BEE was an elitist club. The state saw a need therefore to re-
evaluate the pursuit of black empowerment such to ensure that it is one that is inclusive of a 
much wider mandate to have a further-reaching impact. 
 
2.4.2 The Second Narrative  
 
The second narrative states that there is a broader cause to BEE as envisaged by the later 
development of the B-BBEE Act in 2003. 
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Seeing the controversy and that the first BEE related strategies lacked in depth and specific 
reform areas, the need arose at the beginning of the new millennium to review and revise 
these strategies with the hope to create a more formalised, broader-reaching framework. 
The B-BBEE Act (No 53 of 2003)12 created a legislative framework for the promotion of BEE 
(Government Gazette, 2009). The Act was to embody some of the objectives of reformation 
mentioned in the initial BEECom, however, more precisely, the Act and BEE as a whole 
were to be (and perhaps remain) a key element in the new political order. This broader-
based empowerment strategy was set to streamline black empowerment and do so through 
grouping the core factors into seven elements, namely; ownership, management, 
employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise development as 
well as corporate social investment/socio-economic development initiatives. These elements 
were eventually developed into a scorecard, which is used as a tool to monitor and evaluate 
the performance of various stakeholders in achieving set targets. The driving force behind 
these is that by meeting any or a combination of these objectives, companies (regardless of 
the industry which they operate) have the opportunity to promote empowerment. Broad-
based BEE is therefore designed to move corporate South Africa to be involved and active it 
the transformation agenda, by thoroughly addressing these seven elements. Change from 
the seemingly elitist, non-reformation, narrow BEE mandate was largely driven by vibrant 
discourse among major stakeholders including the ANC and black business owners13 
(Ponte, Roberts and Sittert, 2007).   
 
2.4.3 The Third Narrative 
 
The third narrative involves structural changes in economic arrangements that go well 
beyond anything BEE can address on its own. These would include strategies that are 
aimed at structural changes such as a move to a more labour-intensive economy that can 
absorb the numerous amount of unskilled workforce in the country (Iheduru, 2004). This 
narrative emphasises the need for rapid factor accumulation, for poverty eradication and 
ultimately the achievement of full employment for South Africans, specifically, black South 
Africans. This narrative is to be closely associated with Gqubule’s assertion on the 
maximalist approach. Similarly, in a report conducted by Ernst & Young (2012) it is pointed 
out that the rationale for BEE is to ensure that all who were previously denied access should 
                                                             
12 This is the Act currently in use, regulating all BEE frameworks. The entire Act is available on: 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp 
13 Moreover the state realised that the broader-based version would be a key mechanism in the support for more stable 
business-state relationships in South Africa.  
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now be helped to regain their dignity and become full participants in the economy of South 
Africa. Moreover, depending on the ideological position of the state, this would also include 
discussions around the abandonment of market-basic economic organization, however the 
debate of the third narrative falls outside the scope of this dissertation, as it discusses a 
range of complex issues, with some that are peripheral to the B-BBEE discussion.  
 
 The Arising Complexity of Defining B-BBEE  2.5
 
The years 1998-2003 are arguably the most pivotal in the making of BEE into an 
actual, realisable policy. As a result, there was a substantial amount of detail to clarify before 
the legislation of what later became known as the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act of 2003 as has been highlighted and discussed earlier in the 
chapter through the use of a timeline. Firstly, there was a necessity during those years to 
clearly define BEE before framing it into any framework. What one finds after the description 
of the three existing narratives is that over the years, BEE had come to mean different things 
to different factions. This first BEECom together with the ANC saw it as an integrated and 
coherent socio-economic process that would be located in the broader context of the 
country’s national transformation programme (Chabane, 2003; Iheduru, 2004; Acemoglu et 
al, 2007). Big business saw it as its way of acquiring political capital through opening access 
to ownership through equity while aspiring black capitals viewed it as the first step towards 
creating a black middle-class (Tangri and Southall, 2008). More broadly, society was led to 
believe that since the spatial dimension of apartheid policy created a deep-seated racial 
disadvantage by preventing asset accumulation and systematically undermined the human 
capital of black people through Bantu Education, BEE sought to be an empowerment 
initiative that was essential in redressing the centuries of economic disempowerment. 
 
 What then is B-BBEE? 2.6
 
The ANC government has been grappling with defining BEE as a distinct policy 
instrument that is geared to benefit the previously disadvantaged majority as a whole and 
not just the black elite. The formalization of B-BBEE was thus government’s effort to do 
away with narrow BEE and come up with a strategy to benefit the previously marginalized 
majority in its entirety. 
  
Moreover, according to the BEE Act “broad-based black economic empowerment” 
means the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, 
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youth, persons with disabilities and individuals living in rural areas through diverse 
but integrated socio-economic strategies (The Presidency, 2003). These strategies 
include, but are not limited to: 
a) Increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and 
productive assets; 
b) Facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by 
communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; 
c) Human resource and skills development 
(The Presidency, 2003) 
 
Subsequently, post the development of the Act in 2003, each sector was mandated to 
formulate its own transformation charter14, with specificities that would be suitable for that 
particular sector and could be readily implemented. The negotiations among stakeholders in 
each industry were to lead to a more consolidated and ‘balanced’ B-BBEE scorecard that 
would broadly focus on transformation vis-à-vis ownership, management, skills and 
enterprise development. The broader based Codes and Sector Charters are not only aimed 
at encouraging and formalizing broad-based empowerment but also placed more emphasis 
on the inclusion and participation of women and new sector players. These actions are in 
tune with the second narrative discussed in the paper, which sees the BEE agenda as more 
than ownership and share equity.   
 
Notably, the idea of BEE can be quite elusive as was discussed. There is no escaping the 
fact that both BEE and B-BBEE are indeed fundamentally 'class projects' and that an 
argument can be made that even B-BBEE will only go some reasonable distance towards 
creating an inclusive, equitable society. This argument is however not the focus of this 
dissertation. This study is aimed at assessing the extent to which BEE has been 
implemented in the private sector – specifically the construction industry as well as the 
performance of the sector thereof.  It makes sense to contrast only the first two narratives as 
the paper focuses on the ways in which B-BBEE has gone beyond the initial BEE mandate 
to create a broader and deeper meaning. That is to say that the concentration of the paper is 
the ways in which it (B-BBEEE) seeks to produce a national bourgeoisie, in support of the 
emergence of a skilled middle class beyond BEE.  
 
Furthermore, as legislation supersedes any other documentation, from this point onwards, 
this study is going to use the narrower definition of B-BBEE (originating from the Act) as the 
                                                             
14 The charter is to be discussed in depth in chapter 4.  
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prime definition for all its purposes of investigation. That is, BEE is defined using the DTI 
definition (2003), while B-BBEE is defined regarding the Act of 2003. It follows that the BBBE 
discussed in this paper is significantly narrower than that proposed by Gqubule, Edigheji, 
Butler and Southall, but is indeed still broader than BEE.  
  
  The Components and Elements of B-BBEE 2.7
 
BEE was initially measured according to three pillars, namely; 1) ownership and 
control, 2) management and 3) community development. In order to fit into the idea of B-
BBEE, these three components were further refined. The current seven key elements of B-
BBEE are sub-areas of the three components. Additionally, the components together with 
the elements are focal points of the B-BBEE scorecards. On the next page is the illustration 
(DTI, 2004): 
Table 2: B-BBEE Scorecard and its Elements 
Pillars Beneficiary Elements  
a) Direct Empowerment  
Equity holders, executives and other 
owners and managers of economic 
resources 
1. Ownership 
2. Management Control 
b) Human Resource 
Development 
Employees and job seekers 
3. Employment Equity 
4. Skills Development 
c) Indirect Empowerment  Suppliers, communities and other 
relevant stakeholders 
5. Preferential Procurement  
6. Enterprise Development  
7. Residual/Socio-Economic   
       Development  
Source: DTI, 2012 
  
To measure the impact of B-BBEE’s policy objectives across various entities and sectors 
within the economy, the seven elements are able to provide a common basis for this. The 
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Table 3: The Seven Elements of the Generic B-BBEE Scorecard 
Code Element Objective Weighting 
Compliance  
Targets 
000 Conceptual Framework 
of B-BBEE 
General Principles and Generic Scorecard     
100 Ownership Measures effective ownership of enterprises 
by black people 
20 points  25% +1  
200 Management Control Measures effective control of enterprises by 
black people 
10 points 40-50% 
300 Employment Equity Measures initiatives intended to achieve 
equity in the workplace 
15 points  43%-80% 
400 Skills Development Measures the extent that employers carry out 
initiatives designed to develop the 
competencies of black employees  
15 points  3% of payroll 
500 Preferential 
Procurement 
Measures the extent that enterprises buy 
goods and services from BEE compliant 
suppliers as well as black-owned entities  
20 points  70% 
600 Enterprise 
Development 
Measure the extent to which enterprises 
carry out initiatives contributing to Enterprise 
Development 
15 points  3% (NPAT) 
700 Socio-Economic 
Development 
Measures the extent to which enterprises 
carry out initiatives contributing to socio-
economic development  
5 points 1% (NPAT) 
Total Points  100 points    
Source: DTI, 2012 
 
From the points accumulated from the scorecard, firms are able to ascertain their BEE status 
level, which are as follows: 
 
Table 4: BEE Status Levels 
BEE Status Qualification 
Procurement 
Recognition Level 
Level One Contributor ≥ 100 points on the generic scorecard 135% 
Level Two Contributor ≥ 85 but <100 points on the generic scorecard 125% 
Level Three Contributor ≥ 75 but <85 points on the generic scorecard 110% 
Level Four Contributor ≥ 65 but <75 points on the generic scorecard 100% 
Level Five Contributor ≥ 55 but <65 points on the generic scorecard 80% 
Level Six Contributor ≥ 45 but <55 points on the generic scorecard 60% 
Level Seven Contributor ≥ 40 but <45 points on the generic scorecard 50% 
Level Eight Contributor ≥ 30 but <40 points on the generic scorecard 10% 
Non-compliant Contributor <30 points on the generic scorecard 0% 
Source: DTI, 2012 
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The third column in the table above is a multiple that is used to amplify the recognition 
received by procuring goods and services from a company that complies with BEE at a 
certain level. This is done to encourage procurement from BEE compliant companies. 
Moreover, as a component of the scorecard that is closely related to Enterprise 
Development (ED), it creates an incentive to use ED as a means to improve the recognized 
status of suppliers in “order to bolster the recognition regarding procurement in terms of 
BEE” (Jack, 2007).  
 
This model allows achievements of B-BBEE to be carefully monitored. Additionally, the B-
BBEE Act (2003) provides implementation instruments for B-BBEE. The implementation 
instruments are; the Codes of Good Practice, the B-BBEE Strategy, the Advisory Council, as 
well as the industry-specific Charters. 
 
 Critique and Controversies of B-BBEE Implementation 2.8
 
The implementation of B-BBEE has received a significant amount of negative 
appraisal from various fronts. It is widely argued that few relatively educated black, or more 
precisely, politically connected people, have benefited greatly from new opportunities as a 
result of democracy (Makgetla, 2004). It is often argued that outside the big parastatals, the 
restructuring of capital has done little to open new opportunities for black entrepreneurs. 
 
According to Makgetla (2004), there has been a growing demand from the black upper class 
that government do more to help them penetrate big business. This is an interesting 
assertion considering that looking at the origins of BEE, as described in the first strand of 
BEE, comprised of private sector initiated processes with companies such as Sanlam that 
proactively spearheaded the process. 
 
Pallo Jordan, former ANC Member of Parliament (MP) and Cabinet minister, once argued 
that the emerging black bourgeoisie is perceived as the prime hope for setting “a new 
agenda of corporate social and civil responsibility” (Edigheji, 1999). Others have labelled 
them the “patriotic bourgeoisie” (Edigheji, 1999) or “comrades in business’ as Southall 
(2006) alleged. Edigheji (1999) contends that for proponents of the minimalist BEE 
approach, the success of the black elite or black business would give a psychological boost 
to the black community, giving inspiration to all black people and dispel the illusion that 
commercial success is only a white phenomenon. 
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Adam Habib, current Vice Chancellor of the University of the Witwatersrand once made the 
assertion that, “the designers of the macroeconomic strategy had expected that all the rich 
people that would emerge would use that money to build factories and jobs; in fact, they 
have just accumulated more wealth for themselves” (Philp, 2004). Stober and Robinson also 
made a similar observation stating that, “companies have shown a preference for well-known 
names as they transform their make-up while not risking their value by taking on unknown 
partners with little business experience (Mail & Guardian, 2004). Southall (2006) makes the 
same point and further argues that following the more Africanist orientation adopted under 
the presidency of Thabo Mbeki in 1999; the government’s approach to BEE became 
increasingly focused and assertive. It is stated that the aim of this seemingly more coherent 
and targeted approach to BEE is the creation of a prosperous and prosperity making black 
capitalist class capable of working in close harmony with a “developmental state”15 (Southall, 
2004). 
Thus despite an attempt by government to highlight its focus on ‘broad-based’ BEE with all 
the policy and institutional instruments, it is widely believed that the visibility and presence of 
a BEE minimalist approach continues unabated. This is the assertion that this paper aims to 
analyse and challenge through leaning on its use of four players in construction industry as 
case studies. 
  
                                                             
15 The “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches to BEE simply denote the origins of the empowerment processes, namely; 
bottom-up: from outside government and mainly led by the private sector, and top-down: formalized and led by government. 
The two approaches should not necessarily be interpreted as “narrow” versus “broad” BEE. 
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Chapter 3: The Evolution of South Africa’s 
Construction Industry  
 
 Historical account of the South African Construction 3.1
Sector  
 
The literature of the South African construction industry indicates that the sector finds 
its roots in the migration of white capital and the settling of colonialists in the country (Master 
Builders South Africa, 2007). A great deal of these migrations took place in the 19th century 
due to the discovery of minerals in various parts of the country. In particular, the founding of 
Johannesburg in 1886 brought together individuals from all over the world in what was to 
become known as “the industrial and financial centre of South Africa” (Feinstein, 2005). 
Arguably a considerable of amount of ‘building South Africa’ as it currently stands took place 
in the post-war years. With the formalisation of apartheid in 1948, which saw the National 
Party (NP) ascend to power, came dramatic changes in the development path for the 
construction industry. A skills shortage had a massive impact on the domestic construction 
market, particularly post the World Wars as it became increasingly unsustainable to reserve 
construction jobs for white workers only, due to the volume of work available in the sector 
(Master Builders South Africa, 2007).  
Encountering similar issues was the mining industry which together with the construction 
sector soon became instrumental in the development of the South African economy as both 
utilised cheap black labour. One thus finds that a historical account of one cannot be 
divorced from the other, as both industries have continually developed through rapid 
expansion and oligopolistic behaviour tactics which has resulted in few dominant players in 
the sectors.  
Accompanying the introduction of apartheid was an accelerated growth of ‘big business’ in 
South Africa, as a few large companies, backed by massive state support begun to dominate 
in their industries. In the financial services it was Volkskas that dominated while Sanlam and 
Old Mutual thrived in the insurance market and Anglo American along with de Beers ruled in 
mining. The construction sector was no different, as various construction entities came 
together in the hope that growth in size would strengthen capability, increasing profitability. 
The mining industry – which is marked as the backbone of the South African economy - 
originally comprised of independent white diggers coming from various corners of the world 
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in search of great fortunes in the diamond fields of Kimberley and the gold mines of 
Johannesburg during the late 1800s (Master Builders South Africa, 2007). With mining 
expansions growing rapidly at the beginning of the 20 th century and the requirement for 
underground mining becoming eminent, authorities at the time opted to do away with laws 
that had previously restricted black labourers (Master Builders South Africa, 2007).  As the 
mining industry grew, the construction sector followed closely behind, as demand for 
housing, schooling and other necessities increased. Moreover, the continuous upsurge of 
revenues generated from mining was able to provide means of establishing infrastructure, 
giving rise to a more sophisticated construction industry.  
In the 1920s the construction sector grew to a great extent, becoming one of the largest 
contributors to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The decades to follow saw the 
formation of private construction companies as they took the lead and became instrumental 
in the proliferation of infrastructure development throughout the country, including power 
generation, mining and transportation systems. Thus, during the early years of the century, 
the industry was governed by mostly engineers setting up small businesses, often having to 
enter into joint ventures with other firms for large-scale infrastructure projects (Master 
Builders South Africa, 2007). Naturally the success of these firms in the industry was 
accelerated by huge public sector investment in the infrastructural development of South 
Africa by the National Party (NP) led apartheid government. Thus bolstered by construction, 
mining was an immensely lucrative industry that impacted surrounding mining towns, not just 
for the mines and the profiting entrepreneurs, but also for the expansion of those towns.  
By the 1950s, three of some of the biggest construction companies that exist today were 
dominating the industry. Namely, these were Concor, which was formed in 1948, Barrow 
Construction, which at the time involved in the building of Witwatersrand University, Basil 
Read as well as Roberts Construction. Arguably, the oldest of the firms in the industry is 
Murray & Roberts and has rightly been labelled “the granddaddy of the construction industry 
in South Africa” (Masters Builders South Africa, 2007). The amalgamation between Roberts 
Construction and Murray & Stewart in 1967 to form Murray & Roberts Construction is what 
enlarged these two – already large companies – to become industry giants, sustaining this 
stature for decades to come16. It is therefore later in the 20th century, that the sector begun to 
comprise mainly of large firms such as Murray & Roberts who had tightened their 
relationships with the state through strong political ties with the governing Afrikaners. 
Moreover, such firms, including the likes of Basil Read and Concor managed to acquire 
                                                             
16 Highlights of the Murray & Roberts story are detailed in Chapter 5. 
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smaller start-up companies, diversifying their interests and increasing their service offering 
(Masters Builders South Africa, 2007). 
The late 1960s and early 1970s were boom periods in South Africa as urban construction 
grew rapidly (van Graan, 1993). Moreover, heavy construction, whose fate was tied to 
government infrastructure roll-outs and the mining industry’s capital expenditure, was also 
thriving, requiring the capability of well-resourced construction companies able to meet the 
demands of both their private and public sector clients. Since years of capital controls made 
it difficult for South African companies to invest abroad, this then also resulted in increased 
vertical and horizontal integration by these South African firms. This translated into 
businesses that were largely interested in becoming larger. Perhaps the most pivotal 
illustration of this was in the mid-1970s when a merger between five construction firms was 
approved, marking the establishment of  Group Five, which was to become an industry giant 
in years to come.  
Besides the high level of success achieved by Group Five even during its early days, other 
leading companies in the 1970s, leading up to the 1980s include Goldstein Building (GBT)17, 
WBHO, Murray & Roberts, Concor, Basil Read as well as Tiber Bonvec Construction. 
From a policy chronicle, legislation affecting the construction industry from the 1950s right up 
to the 1980s reinforced the fundamental intentions of apartheid, limiting black participation to 
the domain of unskilled artisans and cheap labour (Sigcau, 2000). This was achieved not 
only through the Bantu Education Act of 1953 but also through the Native Building Workers 
Act of 1951. Job reservation was further reinforced by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. 
As articulated by Sigcau (2000) “These instruments of policy shaped the entire industry to 
the benefit of white artisans, contractors, professionals and materials suppliers”. 
Consequently, the black sector faced a range of hurdles, including the inability to access 
markets, training and finance, with all these contributing to a vicious circle.  
  
  Towards Democracy: Evolution of the Industry in the 3.2
1990s 
 
As the decade of the eighties drew to a close, major political developments had taken 
place in South Africa that would significantly alter the relationships between business and 
government. Ian Robinson, executive director of Building Industries Federation South Africa 
(BIFSA) in 1991 wrote a review on the state of the industry, in which he remarked that, “the 
industry was gripped by the most severe recession since the Second World War with 
                                                             
17 The firm was later incorporated into Group Five. 
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workers leaving the industry in droves and creating a critical skills shortage.” (Master 
Builders South Africa, 2007). He however added that there were signs of sustainable growth 
that were achievable under a new political scenario. There was thus a sense of euphoria 
about prospects in the industry leading up to South Africa’s 1994 democratic elections as 
those in the industry were optimistic about the future.  
Real signs of growth seemingly prevailed for the construction industry in 1994 as the ANC-
led government embarked upon its Reconstruction and Development Plan. The plan came at 
the most opportune moment for the industry as it had been battered by a shortage of work, 
where non-residential building activity had dropped by over 22% in 1993, while investment in 
housing had fallen by 3% (Master Builders South Africa, 2007). Just over 230 companies 
has been liquidated between 1990 and 1994 due to a severe drop of over 40% in investment 
in building. Government’s announcement to take on a mass housing project that would see 
over 100 000 houses built in 1995 and the improvement of infrastructure across the country 
was a challenge well-received by players in the industry.  
To further cement its planning, in 1995 government saw it fit to initiate a ‘Captains of the 
Industry’ initiative in the hope of bringing together major industry stakeholders to discuss 
ways of bringing the industry towards some regulation and moderation (Sigcau, 2000). The 
decades of apartheid meant that there was a disproportionate distribution of infrastructural 
resources that were accessible to black people, resulting in massive backlogs of basic 
services to a majority of citizens. The meeting addressed the partnership roles of 
government and industry, with the view that this collaboration would give impetus to the 
shaping of a comprehensive policy framework.   
The industry thus had to evolve in the 1990s from one that served a predominately white 
society, developing areas, cities and towns for the betterment and convenience of white 
South Africans towards a more innovate and inclusive sector. Government resources 
through the RDP were channelled towards building homes and developing infrastructure that 
would address the challenges faced by the country’s black majority.  
For the purpose of this study, in order to understand the current structure of the industry, it is 
vital to examine and delve into a deeper discussion about the body which began from these 
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 The Present Structure of the Construction Industry 3.3
 
As previously alluded to, before the establishment of the Construction Industry 
Development Board (CIDB), the organisational structure of the industry was such that firms 
had no legitimate regulating authority and was an industry that excluded any black owned or 
managed companies from competing for any large scale (private or public sector) projects. 
Below is a timeline detailing the key developmental milestones towards bringing the state 
and private sector together, followed by a discussion on the current structure of the industry.  
Figure 2: Sector Milestones 
 
Following the “Captains of Industry Initiative” an inter-ministerial task team was established 
in 1997 to develop proposals and content that would result in a green paper. The motivation 
for the Green Paper arose out of a shared interest among various stakeholders to have a 
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growth that the construction sector could play18. With such a broad mandate, it became the 
duty of the task team19 to engage intensively with industry stakeholders in refining what was 
to be the construction sector’s development policy and framework. In 1998 after numerous 
rigorous debates, feedback from the Green Paper was received by the task team with the 
general feedback pointing towards the necessity of a body that would better integrate the 
construction industry as well as align the sector’s vision and objectives with national interest 
(Department of Public Works, 1999)20.  
The White Paper tabulated in 1999 was thus a result of a very broad public policy making 
process, putting together the greatest concerns of the industry from data gathered from the 
Green Paper and the debates that followed it. At the time, the RDP was South Africa’s 
national developmental framework, thus, the spirit of the White Paper encapsulated the 
values of the RDP. The White Paper also made clear the vision and objectives for the 
industry, paving the way for the formation of the Construction Industry Development Board 
(CIDB).  
The CIDB Act 38 of 200021 established the CIDB “in order to implement an integrated 
strategy for the reconstruction growth and development of the construction industry” (Centre 
for Competition, Regulation and Economic Development, 2014). Other regulatory 
requirements that seek to broadly police and monitor the industry, ensuring that it keeps up 
with a national agenda, include B-BBEE. Besides the B-BBEE Act, there are also the Joint 
Building Contract Committee (JBCC) contractual rules, the Competition Act no. 89 of 1998, 
as amended (the Competition Act), the Employment Equity Act, as well as the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa.  
 
 The Foundation of the CIDB 3.4
 
Emanating from the White Paper Creating an Enabling Environment for 
Reconstruction, Growth and Development in the Construction Industry, the CIDB Act set the 
agenda for the promotion of industrial growth and development to be spearheaded through a 
partnership between the private and public sectors. In 2001, the CIDB was founded, with the 
                                                             
18 Cabinet support had already been obtained in 1996 to develop a construction sector policy, with the Department of Public 
Works mandated to lead this initiative. The South African constitution had not been adapted at the time, prolonging any 
processes for government policy formation.  
19 The task team was drawn from both industry and government and supported by the Public Works Secretariat.  
20 Feedback was received from more than 20 organisations and individuals.  
21 A draft bill was first put before cabinet in 1999 and later approved.  
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appointment of a board chaired by Brian Bruce22 and Spencer Hodgson as its first CEO23. 
The table below describes a few of the building blocks that lead to the founding and 
establishment of the CIDB, picking up on details excluded from the previous timeline. 
Table 5: The CIDB Timeline 
 
Statutory Building Blocks for the Establishment of the CIDB 
Appointment of the CIDB Board  April 2001 
Approval by Ministers of Public Works and Finance of the 
Remuneration System for top management 
August 2001 
CEO Appointed December 2001 
CIDB is listed as a Schedule 3A public entity enabling transfer of funds 
from the Department of Public Works (DPW) 
December 2001 
First transfer of funds by DPW based on a Summary Business Plan for 
2001 
December 2001 
Approval by Ministers of Public Works and Finance of the 
Remuneration System for the envisaged CIDB staff establishment, 
enabling the staff recruitment plan 
January 2002 
Development of the 2002/03 Business Plan for Submission to the 
Minister of Public Works 
March 2002 
Preparations to establish and convene the Stakeholder Forum March 2002 
Source: CIDB Annual Report 2001/2002 
 
 
 Mandate and Objectives of the CIDB 3.5
 
According to its website, the CIDB sees its role as “to provide leadership to 
stakeholders and to stimulate sustainable growth, reform and improvement of the 
construction sector for effective delivery and the industry’s enhanced role in country’s 
                                                             
22 Brian Bruce was at the CEO at Murray & Roberts at the time. 
23 Spencer Hodgson was seconded to Wits University by M&R to assist in their major expansion programme 
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economy” (CIDB, 2015). The CIDB is a form of government agency with a board that is 
made up of both private and public sector individuals appointed by the Minster of Public 
Works and reports to that particular Minster. Additionally, this organisation is mandated to 
provide strategic leadership that is necessary for a transformed and enabling environment.  
As previously mentioned, this organ is mandated by the CIDB Act that stipulates the work to 
be served by the board. According to the CIDB the criteria for selecting those board 
members is based on one’s individual knowledge and expertise of the construction industry. 
These board members assume a non-executive role, relying on the executive capacity of the 
organisation to implement the CIDB mandate and its desired objectives (CIDB, 2015).   
The objectives of the CIDB are expansive and aimed at both promoting the growth and 
development of the sector as well as providing a regulatory framework within which the 
sector should operate. These objectives, amongst others, are as follows (CIDB Act, 2000): 
 Promote the contribution of the construction industry in meeting national construction 
demand and in advancing (i) national, social and economic development objectives, 
(ii) industry, performance, efficiency and competitiveness, and (iii) improved value to 
clients. 
 Provide strategic leadership to construction industry stakeholders to stimulate 
sustainable growth, reform and improvement of the construction sector.  
 Promote best practice through the development and implementation of appropriate 
programmes and measures aimed at best practice and improved performance of 
public and private sector clients, contractors and other participants in the construction 
delivery process. 
 Promote, establish or endorse uniform standards and ethical standards that regulate 
the actions, practices and procedures of parties engaged in construction contracts. 
 Promote sustainable growth of the construction industry and the participation of the 
emerging sector therein. 
 Promote appropriate research on any matter related to the construction industry and 
its development. 
Moreover, contractors that are not registered with the Board are not allowed to 
undertake, carry out or complete any construction works for the public sector 
(Department of Public Works, 2006).  
To further streamline the structure of the industry, the CIDB instituted other mechanisms to 
organise the various enterprises operating in the industry. One such mechanism is that 
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under the establishment of the CIDB, the industry has been divided into these four 
subgroups: 
 General building construction 
 Industrial construction 
 Commercial building  
 Heavy civil construction 
  
The South African construction sector is therefore one that is rather complex and multi-
faceted. However one finds that there are firms that conduct operations across all 
subgroups. Moreover, the various firms operating in the industry have been divided by the 
board into grades. 
 
 Grading of Firms 3.6
 
The CIDB established 20 standard grading systems ranging from grade 1 to grade 9. 
There are various factors used to determine the grading, such as the contractor’s annual 
turnover, the company’s track record and size of its completed contracts. Below is a table 
illustrating the nine grades with the maximum value that a contractor that falls into that grade 
is permitted to tender for. As one will notice, there is no maximum value for grade 9 
contractors. Additionally, there is a category for ‘potential emerging contractors’ who are 
allowed to bid for tenders that are usually restricted to contractors that are graded one 
category higher. Construction jobs in bulk power services, road works and mining surface 
earthworks are dominated by the large construction companies while medium-sized 
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Table 6: CIDB Firm Grading 
Grade Tender Value less than or 
equal to R/ Upper limit of 
tender value range     
Best Annual Turnover 
(R) (50% of Upper 
Limit of tender value 
range) 
Largest Contact (R) 
(22,5% of Upper limit 
of Tender value 
range. 20% for Grade 
2) 
Available 
Capital (R) (10% 
of Upper limit of 
Tender value 
range. 5% for 
Grade 3 & 4) 
1 200 000 - - - 
2 650 000 - 130 000 - 
3 2 000 000 1 000 000 450 000 100 000 
4 4 000 000 2 000 000 900 000 200 000 
5 6 500 000 3 250 000 1 500 000 650 000 
6 13 000 000 6 500 000 3 000 000 1 300 000 
7 40 000 000 20 000 000 9 000 000 4 000  000 
8 130 000 000 65 000 000 30 000 000 13 000 000 
9 no limit  200 000 000 90 000 000 40 000 000 
Source: CIDB, 2013 
 
The value of a tender that a firm can bid for is based on factors such as its annual turnover, 
value of projects undertaken and available working capital, as depicted in the table above. 
The system is thus able to regulate the extent to which firms can participate in bids for public 
sector work. There are also provisions in regulations that allow firms to enter into joint 
ventures, with the possibility that they could receive a higher grade and bid for certain 
projects. For instance, if there is to be a large project with a value of over R130 million 
(grade 9), the provision stipulates that a joint venture of three grade 8 firms could compete 
with the other grade 9 firms (CIDB, 2013). 
 
 Number of registered firms  3.7
 
There are numerous construction firms that are registered with the CIDB, as per the 
CIDB Act requirement. A majority of these firms are concentrated in the lower CIDB grades. 
For a firm to be registered as a grade 1 contractor, they need not have any turnover, nor 
have worked on a project or even be working on one (Centre for Competition Regulation and 
Economic Development, 2014). A bulk of the professional work is accounted for by grade 5 
to 9 contractors. Therefore, it is activities within this category that provide a better indication 
of the well-being of the sector, according to the CIDB. This is worthy to note as this paper 
uses four level 9 contractors as its case study of the relations between the sector and black 
empowerment. Moreover, most of the work of the construction industry is in the general 
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building and civil engineering sub-categories, both categories in which the chosen cases are 
operational in. The table below illustrates the number of contractors who entered, exited or 
are currently active in the grades 5 to 9 category between 2009 and 2014.  
Table 7: CIDB Registered Contractors (grades 5-9) 2009-2014 
  Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 9 
General Building 
New Entrants 266 348 142 44 26 
Exits 157 179 71 28 12 
Current 432 613 309 112 54 
Civil Engineering 
New Entrants 305 378 162 47 23 
Exits 177 219 82 25 15 
Current 465 718 353 129 67 
Source: CIDB, 2014 
 
The table reveals that there are a number of firms that are active in these categories 
between grade 5 to 7, with the number lowering for grades 8-9, however with over 100 
registered grade 9 level firms. Likewise, there are a number of firms that have exited the 
sector, for various reasons such as downgrading, liquidation, merging or voluntary exit. With 
grade 9 being the highest that a contractor can achieve and with a thresholding starting at 
R130 million, it is only these firms that can bid for large infrastructure projects. However in 
practice, of the 67 ‘currently active’ registered civil engineering firms, it is approximately 10 
that have the capabilities to undertake large civil engineering projects such as the 
construction of highways, stadiums, power stations and the like (Centre for Competition 
Regulation and Economic Development, 2014). To better reflect this, graphically illustrated 
below are the top 10 construction companies by market capitalisation.  
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Figure 3: Market Capitalization for Top Ten South African Construction Companies (R’ Billions) 
 
 (Source: PWC, 2014) 
 
Since market capitalisation shows “the organic growth or regression, merger and acquisition 
activities and market expectations about the future” (PWC, 2014), it is a good enough 
indicator when one is determining the key players in the industry. Leading the firms is indeed 
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Murray & Roberts which is the oldest construction firm in South Africa. These companies 
have led some of the biggest construction projects in the country, ranging from road works, 
electrification and buildings.   
 
 Chapter Summary 3.8
 
The framework developed by the CIDB is one that is telling of the current structure of 
the industry. Before the formation of the board, the industry was unregulated, thus, the CIDB 
was not only an evolutionary addition to the industry but also brought with it the force to have 
part of its mandate focused on transformation in the industry. Part of the ethos to establish 
such a structural framework under which the sector would operate was to propel the 
inclusion of black business that would be able to develop with the guidance that the CIDB 
can provide. The South African construction industry does, however, remain dominated by a 
few large firms (grade 9) that are at best able to compete with the worlds’ best. 
Unfortunately, the bottom end of the market is dominated by many unsophisticated and 
inexperienced contractors; this has inevitably resulted in the failure and closure of many 
firms.   
To understand the next chapter, it is essential to point out that the CIDB, particularly its 
board directors and executive staff had an important role to play in the development of the 
industry’s transformation charter as will be discussed. The establishment of this board is a 
vital stepping stone in a discussion about addressing transformation in the industry. 
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Chapter 4: Where B-BBEE and the 
Construction Industry meet: The 





Subsequent to the establishment of the B-BBEE Act, each sector was mandated to 
formulate its own transformation charter, with specificities that would be suitable for that 
particular industry and could be readily implemented. The negotiations among stakeholders 
in each industry were to lead to a more consolidated and ‘balanced’ B-BBEE charter and 
scorecard that would broadly focus on transformation vis-à-vis the seven elements. 
Additionally, one finds that the broader based codes and sector charters are not only aimed 
at encouraging and formalizing broad-based empowerment but also placed more emphasis 
on the inclusion and participation of women and new sector players.   
Consequently, in this chapter I evaluate and discuss the meeting of these two components, 
through the negotiation, formulation, promulgation and implementation of the Construction 
Sector Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Charter. This charter was first 
published in the Government Gazette in February 2007, together with the DTI’s Code of 
Good Practice and became legally binding from May 2009. It has thus only been operational 
for under seven years, however, a discussion of the details of the process that initiated the 
charter is one worthy of having as various challenges and controversies arose during the 
drafting of the Construction Sector B-BBEE Charter. It was no doubt as a result of the 
numerous stakeholders whose consultation was integral to the formation of a sectoral 
charter. The following discussion gives insight into the challenges faced regarding the 
monitoring arrangements that were associated with efforts towards implementing the charter. 
It also makes note of a few individuals and organisations involved in the drafting of the 
charter. Thus, before delving into the details embedded within the charter and evaluating the 
performance of the four enterprises, it is perhaps useful to discuss the manner in which the 
charter came about.  
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 The Negotiation in the setting of the Construction Sector 4.2
B-BBEE Charter   
 
The charter initiative was launched in October 2004 by Stella Sigcau, who was then 
Minister of Public Works (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2005). All stakeholders from the 
construction sector were invited to participate in the process, which was to commence in 
July 2005. An Integrated Management Committee (IMC) which was to oversee the entire 
process was established and would include major trade unions, women’s groups and 
business associations (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2005). The IMC was thus 
responsible for forming technical committees that would provide research that would inform 
proposals for the charter. Ultimately, the drafting of the charter comprised of a cluster of 
board members from the then newly formed CIDB and comprised of 16 other parties. 
Namely, they were; the National Department of Public Works, African Builders Association, 
The Association of South African Quantity Surveyors, Electrical Contractors Association 
South Africa, Master Builders of South Africa, National Association of Black Contractors and 
Allied Traders, National Federation of the Building Industry, The South African Association of 
Consulting Engineers, South African Black Technical and Allied Careers Organization, South 
African Federation for Civil Engineering Contractors, South African Institute of Architects, 
Southern African Institute of Steel Construction, South African Women in Construction, 
Women for Housing, National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), and Building Construction & 
Allied Workers Union as well as members from the various firms operating in the industry 
(Department of Public Works, 2006).  
 
To better streamline the organisational process of finalizing a charter, a steering portfolio 
committee of the Charter Working Group was created in 2005 and was made up of 
individuals - some from these organisations - who would take the lead on the entire process. 
The steering portfolio committee, which was co-chaired by James Ngobeni and Mike Wylie24 
thus took responsibility for the development of the charter, a process that took just over six 
years to finalise. 
Part of the disagreements on the weightings of the scorecard and the objectives of the 
charter that stalled the entire process centred on the timeframes set for the realization of 
specific targets (Mashigo, 2005). Since the drafting of the charter had to bring together such 
a broad range of major stakeholders, including labour unions, large corporate firms, various 
                                                             
24 Interestingly, there are a few individuals who formed part of this steering portfolio committee, who later assumed dominant 
positions in the big construction companies discussed later in this paper. James Ngobeni later becomes a board member for 
WBHO, while Mike Wylie was the chairperson of the WBHO board. Appendix A illustrates some of the influential shapers of 
the charter, who also held or hold board positions in one of these top companies.    
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industry councils and government, the process was almost bound to be prolonged by 
differing imperatives. Unions and some government agencies pushed for narrower 
timeframes, while larger industry players, argued that wider timeframes would result in a 
more sustainable improvement. According to James Ngcobo, another area of contention was 
with regards to the acquisition of a stake in the sector by organized labour. Although there 
was an agreement in principle with organized labour that they would have an interest in the 
industry, the format under which this would take place took longer to agree on, with labour 
demanding at least a 10% stake at the beginning of the drafting process (Mashigo, 2005). 
Ngcobo (Mashigo, 2005) however insists that it was not around the spirit and core objectives 
of the charter that there were disagreements among stakeholders. He suggested that since 
the charter was to apply to all that operated in the industry, and simultaneously needed the 
‘buy-in’ of all the main industry participants, its negotiations took place in arguably good faith, 
with participants often willing to come to some compromises. 
 
Additionally, it was decided that the same team that was responsible for the Construction 
Charter would also drive the Property Sector Transformation Charter since both were seen 
to be moving in a similar direction (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2005). Since both these 
charters were to be finalized simultaneously, this added work and commitment to the 
committee. Further, it was essential that the construction Charter aligned with the Codes of 
Good Practice, for it to be implemented in the sector. As there was a lag in the establishment 
of the codes, this further delayed the finalization of the construction charter.  Thus six years 
and six versions later, it was in 2009 that the Construction Sector B-BBEE Charter was 
finally born. 
 
 Outline of the Charter  4.3
 
Accordingly, the primary objective of the charter is to not only provide the industry 
with a framework to address B-BBEE, but also to “enhance and increase the productivity of 
the sector to meet world best practice” (Department of Public Works, 2006).  With a list of 
more than ten aims including; the promotion of employment equity, the adherence to 
principles of non-racialism and non-sexism, the enhancement of entrepreneurial 
development with sustainable growth for SMEs in the sector as well as the improvement of 
the capacity of the public sector to deliver and promote greater partnerships with 
government in development initiatives, the charter seeks to lay the groundwork for its 
visionary targets that are imperative to transformation.  
 
Page | 36  
 
Constituted as a shared approach among all stakeholders, it “lays the basis for the 
development of a Code of Good Practice for the Construction Sector, as envisioned in the B-
BBEE Act” (Department of Public Works, 2006), while simultaneously attempting to address 
the rapidly changing economic climate that is more celebratory of innovation than engaged 
with issues of equality and redistribution. Moreover, the charter charges companies to 
develop capabilities and capacities that are necessary to facilitate the achievement of set 
targets. Additionally, government support plays a critical role in the facilitation of this growth, 
including the monitoring and evaluation of the progress of an enterprise towards B-BBEE. 
 
 Components of the Scorecard 4.4
 
Embedded within the charter is the scorecard. As an undeniably significant 
component of B-BBEE in the construction sector, the scorecard is regarded as the main tool 
for setting transformation standards against which individual enterprises are measured. It 
commits government, industry and labour to planning mechanisms that enable businesses to 
achieve their B-BBEE targets (Fauconnier and Mathur-Helm, 2008). Moreover, the 
scorecard seeks to act as the custodian of black advancement in the workplace, seeing to it 
that there are pre-determined targets that players in the industry ought to achieve. 
According to the charter, the scorecard “provides an objective and broad-based set of 
measurement indicators for purposes of measuring B-BBEE progress in and between 
construction enterprises, in different sub-sectors and in the construction sector as a whole” 
(Department of Public Works, 2006). The scorecard, including all its elements and inputs 
pertain to the South African operations of enterprises.  
There are four components that make up the scorecard, namely;  
1. Elements: These are derived from the B-BBEE Act as well as the codes of good 
practice which are issued in terms of the Act 
2. Targets: These are the quantifiable measurement of transformational initiatives. 
3. Weightings: This is the number on the scorecard against which an enterprise’s 
performance in terms of a particular target is measured  
4. Indicators: The area of measurement pertaining to an element of B-BBEE 
(Department of Public Works, 2006). 
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 The Scorecard  4.5
 
Illustrated below is the detailed scorecard by each element, its subcategory, 
weighting and target for enterprises operating in the construction sector. The charter, as well 
as its scorecard, applies to all companies that are involved in the creation, expansion, and/or 
maintenance of fixed assets related to residential or non-residential buildings, infrastructure, 
or any other form of construction works in South Africa, irrespective of their size/grade.  
 
Table 8: The detailed Construction Sector B-BBEE Scorecard, Ownership element 
Ownership (25 points) 







Voting rights in the hands of 
black people 
4 30 











Economic interest to which 
black people are entitled 
5 30 
Economic interest to which 
black women are entitled 
2 10 
Economic interests to which 
black broad based and/or black 
designated groups, specifically 





Ownership fulfillment 1 No restrictions 
Net equity value 6 30 
Source: Department of Public Works, 2006 
 
In comparison to the generic scorecard, the ownership element of this scorecard has been 
dismantled into three subcategories, each detailing various other objectives that are to be 
met by a further ‘breakdown’ of goals, taken from the overall target. One such target is 
‘economic interest, which refers to the entitlement of black people to dividends, capital gains 
and rights held by shareholders (Department of Public Works, 2006). Furthermore, although 
the points weighting for ownership remain at 2525 (like the generic scorecard), the manner in 
which those 25 points are achievable has been explicitly specified by the drafters of this 
charter. Additionally, when signing the charter, enterprises in the construction sector 
                                                             
25 The targets are 25% and the weighting is 25 points. 
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committed to achieving all these targets by December 2013 (with a few exceptions set to be 
fulfilled by 2010), a commitment yet to be fulfilled.   
 
 
Table 9: The detailed Construction Sector B-BBEE Scorecard, Management element 
Management Control (10 points) 





Members of the board who are black 
people as a % of the board 
3.5 40 
Members of the board who are black 







Executive Management who are black 
people as a % of Executive Management 
3.5 25/40 
Executive Management who are black 
women as a % of Executive Management 
1.5 10/ 16 
Source: Department of Public Works, 2006 
 
In so far as management control is concerned, the commitments made in the charter were 
that by December 2010, 25/40% of black people would be at the executive level while by 
December 2013, 10/16% black women would be at executive management level. The 
advancement of black women, in particular, was seen as a critical objective in the charter, 
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Table 10: The detailed Construction Sector B-BBEE Scorecard, Employment Equity element 
Employment Equity (10 points)26 







Black Senior Management as % of 
total senior management 
2 25/40 
Black women in Senior 






Black middle management as % of 
total mid-management 
2 30/40 
Black women in middle 









Black junior management as a % 
of total junior management 
2 65 
Black women junior management 
as a % of total junior management 
1 27 
 
BEPs - All 
Management 
Black people at all management 
levels 
6 30/40 
Black women at all management 
levels 
4 12/16 
Source: Department of Public Works, 2006 
 
 
The racial and gender representivity in the sector are “symptomatic of apartheid 
discriminatory policies”, (Department of Public Works, 2006). The EE aspect of the 
scorecard consequently commits signatories to the charter to promote non-racialism and 
gender sensitivity in the workplaces as well as enhance cultural diversity. These values are 
also embedded in the Employment Equity Act. The scorecard has also been designed such 
that enterprises in the sector are required to submit their employment equity plans and 
certificates of compliance together with their annual B-BBEE reports. Accordingly, the failure 
to comply with the statutory and administrative requirements of the Act results in a zero 
score for employment equity on the scorecard. This means that companies must, at least, 
met the requirements of the EE Act as the EE provisions in the charter are over and above 
those stipulated in the EE Act. 
 
 
                                                             
26 Under the Amended Codes of Good Practice released in 2013 and which came into effect on 1st May 2015, management 
control and employment equity have been consolidated into one element. Although with substantially the same indicators, 
the new combined element is worth 19 points (Levenstein, 2014).   
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Table 11: The detailed Construction Sector B-BBEE Scorecard, Skills Development element 
Skills Development (15 points)27 






Direct training cost as a % 
of payroll per annum 
2 1.5 
% of total skills development 
spent on black people 
2 70 
% of spend on black people 
spent on black women 
1 25 
% of spend on black people 
spent on black management 
1 25 
% of spend on  black 
management spend on 






Learnerships as a % of 
employees 
1 2.5 
Black learnership positions 
as % of total Learnerships 
1.5 70 
Black women learnership 
positions as % of total 
Learnerships 
1 35 
Learnership for Black 






Bursary expenditure on 
black students, as a % of 
payroll 
2 0,3 
                                                             
27 Under the Amended Codes of Good Practice, Skills Development has increased from 15 points to 25 points (Levenstein, 
2014). 
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Skills Development (15 points)27 




Implementation of an 
approved and verified 
mentorship programme 
2 Yes 
   Source:  Department of Public Works, 2006 
 
 
These targets were set under the affirmation that the construction sector consists of a large 
low-skilled labour force and a limited number of highly skilled professionals. Adequately 
investing in skills development was set to also be compliant with the Skills Development Act. 
Enterprises are therefore required to include proof of submission of their workplace skills 
plan and implementation report in their annual B-BBEE report. Exactly as is with 
employment equity, non-compliance with the requirements of the Act results in a zero score 
for skills development on the scorecard.  
 
Beyond the efforts addressed in the scorecard, the sector aims to embark on four additional 
tasks as means to comprehensively address skills development. Briefly, these are; 
1. Promote the various career opportunities available in the sector as well as provide 
guidance on the access to these opportunities through training 
2. Interact more actively with the relevant SETAs and tertiary institutions to foster 
appropriate skills transfer, as well as facilitate the accreditation of various workplace 
skills training initiatives 
3. Use workplace training, career path development and effective succession planning 
as a means to increase the level of retention 
4. With assistance from the CSCC, develop a mechanism to certify in-house training 
and recognise the prior learning and development of employees where the enterprise 
is not a certified training provider.  







Page | 42  
 
Table 12: The detailed Construction Sector B-BBEE Scorecard, Procurement and Enterprise 
Development element 
Preferential Procurement (20 points) 
Sub Category Detail Weighting Target (%) 
 
Total weighted procurement on 
B-BBEE-accredited companies 
(measured as per the table in 
the charter) as a % of 
procurement 
20 70 
Enterprise Development (15 points)28 
 
Input 5 (5) Yes/No 
 
Total Turnover Ratio 5 (2.5) 5 
 
Output 5 (2.5) 
Annual GDP 
Growth 
Residual (5 points) 
 
CSI as a percentage of payroll 5 0,25 
Source: Department of Public Works, 2006 
 
 
The procurement target was a commitment by enterprises to achieve a weighted target of 
procurement spent from B-BBEE suppliers of 70% by December 2013 (Department of Public 
Works, 2006). Preferential Procurement refers to the utilization of black owned suppliers, 
service providers or other previously disadvantaged contractors in the supply chain of these 
enterprises. Essentially, Preferential Procurement measures the subcontracting 
arrangements made by the construction companies in the industry with B-BBEE compliance 
companies. Entities are thus encouraged to procure from other companies that have a good 
B-BBEE contribution level based on the scores they have obtained on their scorecards. 
Therefore, it is not only that in order for a subcontractor to be considered B-BBEE complaint, 
it must be owned, managed and controlled by black people, but that it must also have an 
                                                             
28 According to the Amended Codes of Good Practice, Preferential Procurement and Enterprise Development have been 
combined into one element. The new element known as Enterprise and Supplier Development (E and SD) is worth 44 points 
(Levenstein, 2014).  
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overall good contribution level as per its B-BBEE scorecard. In addition to the target set for 
procurement, signatories of the Charter agreed to the following commitments: 
1. The implementation of mechanisms to counter fronting and the abuse of targeting 
arrangements 
2. To develop and implement targeted procurement policies. This would include 
promoting accessibility of tendering opportunities and early payment cycles  
3. Promote compliance to B-BBEE among suppliers regarding their relevant sector 
charters and 
4. Enhance the benefits to local communities and attempt to target appropriate 
procurement from local enterprises, specifically micro and small enterprises with 
black ownership exceeding 50% 
 (Department of Public Works, 2006) 
 
Moreover, due to its importance preferential procurement has specificities that are generic 
and applicable to all, irrespective of industry.  
 







B-BBEE Procurement Spend from all suppliers 
based on the B-BBEE Procurement Recognition 
Level as a percentage of Total Measured 
Procurement Spend 
12 50% 70% 
B-BBEE Procurement Spend from Qualifying Small 
Enterprises or Exempted Micro-Enterprises based on 
the applicable B-BBEE Procurement Recognition 
Level as a percentage of Total Procurement Spend 
3 10% 15% 
B-BBEE Procurement Spend from any of the following Suppliers as a percentage of Total Measured 
Procurement Spend 
Suppliers that are 50% black owned; and 3 9% 12% 
Suppliers that are 30% black women owned 2 6% 8% 
 Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2007 
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In addition, the procurement from suppliers of goods and services are to be measured 
against the table matrix in Chapter 229.  
 
The enterprise development element is made up of three indicators. One such indicator, the 
total turnover ratio means that enterprises in the sector ought to aim to “target a percentage 
of their total annual turnover of the developing organisation as a percentage of total annual 
turnover of the established organisation of 5% by Dec 2013” (Department of Public Works, 
2006). This target is yet to be met. Additionally, some organisations have set up supplier or 
service provider development initiatives, which would include guiding, mentoring, coaching, 
tendering, tender advice and in some cases, direct investment into SMME’s in their efforts to 
develop enterprises. Also, there are numerous other enterprise development programmes 
such as management and labour skills transfer, procurement skills transfer as well as legal 
compliance skills transfer (Department of Public Works, 2006).  
 
Corporate Social Investment (CSI) is the only category in the residual element. Numerous 
sector specific projects including, (i) the promotion of and support for the development of 
women in the sector, (ii) an establishment of a Construction Advice Centre and (iii) education 
and training to increase the participation of black people in the sector. CSI projects are 
therefore largely comprised of various forms of education, training, guidance, development 
support initiatives and development programmes.  
 
  Monitoring the Scorecard: Construction Sector Charter 4.6
Council 
 
Progress towards transformation and empowerment within the construction sector 
are measured and marked by the sector’s compliance with the Charter and its scorecard. 
Another external body known as the Construction Sector Charter Council (CSCC) was 
established as a result of the institutionalisation of the Charter in 2007 and was tasked with 
the responsibility to be the vanguard of measuring compliance with the Charter. What 
distinguishes this body from the CIDB is that its role is to oversee and monitor the progress 
of transformation and empowerment in the construction sector, and it is made up of industry 
voluntary associations which represent established and emerging construction industry 
businesses, labour organizations and the Department of Public Works (CSCC, 2014). 
Moreover, the CSCC has the regulatory responsibility to report to the DPW, the DTI and the 
                                                             
29 Refer to table 3 in Chapter 2. 
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B-BBEE Advisory Council on an annual basis on the state of transformation and 
empowerment. 
 
The CSCC, therefore, has no regulatory authority over the industry, but merely oversees and 
measures the level of enterprise compliance to the Charter and scorecard. 
 
Moreover, the CSCC relies on data obtained from the CIDB to conduct its evaluations and 
highlight the general trends in the industry (CSCC, 2014). The CSCC also relies 
substantially on the submission of an annually independently audited report from an 
accredited verification agency that each enterprise is instructed to submit to the council. 
These reports which are to be made publicly accessible must contain the enterprise’s 
scorecard and an account of progress in achieving the qualitative undertakings outlined in 
the charter. 
 
 Chapter Summary  4.7
 
This chapter began by looking at the negotiation and establishment of the Construction 
Sector B-BBEE Charter in great detail and subsequently examined the sector scorecard.  
Hence, the focus of this chapter was to detail how the sector charter emerged, as well as 
describe its elements and indicators. The remainder of the paper seeks to test the validity of 
the statement that the construction industry has substantially transformed and that B-BBEE 
has been successfully implemented, by particularly focusing on four large enterprises within 
the industry. Moreover, having gone through a discussion of; (i) what B-BBEE is comprised 
of, (ii) the development of organisations such as the CIDB to further grow the sector and (iii) 
the charter and its scorecard, one finds that through a demonstration of a case, there would 
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Chapter 5: The Implementation of B-BBEE 
by four leading South African construction 
firms 
 
 Introduction and Research Methodology  5.1
 
BEE policies and eventually the B-BBEE scorecards are one way that the ANC 
government has engaged the private sector in an effort to push them to reform. With the 
dismantling of apartheid, three segments became available for corporate construction South 
African companies; (i) the South African private sector (ii) South African public sector 
through procurement and (iii) regional and international business. They now had the option 
to participate in the global and local arena, with the lifting of sanctions and the liberalization 
of markets. It has thus been widely asserted that the manner in which the private sector has 
engaged with BEE/B-BBEE policy in South Africa has been insufficient in addressing its core 
purpose. It, however, remains to be shown that indeed the private sector, but more 
specifically the construction industry has been unresponsive in their corporate strategies and 
unaffected in their growth by BEE policy as is often claimed.  
Hence, the responses that four leading construction companies have had to transformation 
policy would assist in determining the sector’s engagement with black empowerment. The 
gathered evidence can act as a springboard towards better understanding the overall rules 
of engagement that the industry has had with B-BBEE and transformation in South Africa.   
The two subsequent chapters discuss and analyse in great detail the implementation of B-
BBEE by four leading South African construction firms. This chapter tracks and describes 
the processes that each company followed in their progression towards compliance with the 
scorecard. This includes a detailing of black executives from each firm, as well as company 
scores vis-à-vis the targets set in the construction sector B-BBEE charter.  
This chapter primarily deals with the manner in which the companies addressed issues 
about transformation during the early years of democracy, tracking the movements up till 
their implementation of B-BBEE. With the use of timelines, this chapter begins by illustrating 
an outline of the main developments of each firm since its inception, which spans over three 
decades for all the firms. Accompanying these timelines are tables that describe some key 
factors about the firms. This then sets the tone for a discussion on how various steps were 
taken by each company (from the period 1994-2014), towards compliance with B-BBEE and 
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other transformation imperatives. The following chapter (chapter 6) will explore how the 
business strategies of the four firms evolved (in part as a response to B-BBEE) – and how 
this affected performance over time. 
 
 An Overview of the key milestones from the Four 5.2
Construction Companies  
 
5.2.1 Murray & Roberts 
 
Figure 4: Murray & Roberts Timeline 
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Murray & Roberts is an investment 
holding company with interests in 
the construction & engineering, 
underground mining development, 
construction materials and related 
fabrication sectors. 
• Southern Africa, 
• Middle East 
• Australasia 
• North America 
• South America 
• Southeast Asia 
33 281 
R34,754.9m ♦ Southern 
Africa: R14,224.0m 
(2013) 
Source: Gauteng Growth Development Agency, 2015 
 
Evolving from a family business to a JSE listed company in 1951, Murray & Roberts 
Construction is said to be one of the largest players in the construction sectors of Africa, the 
Middle East as well as East Asia. Murray & Roberts as a group was formally established in 
1967 through a merger between Murray & Stewart with Roberts Construction. Douglas 
Roberts was the founding chairperson of the group. In 1970, the firm began diversifying into 
other industries including mining, redefining itself as a holding company. The 1980s saw the 
firm activities in the field of process engineering, project management and design continue to 
develop, thus remaining a highly diversified industrial group.  
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5.2.2 WBHO  
 
Figure 5: WBHO Timeline 
 
Source: WBHO Annual Reports, 1994-2014 
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WBHO operates as a holding 
company of a number of 
subsidiary companies 
principally engaged in building 
construction, civil engineering 








♦ South Africa: R8,736.0m 
(2013) 
Source: Gauteng Growth Development Agency, 2015 
 
With its origin in the 1970s, WBHO Construction is principally involved in Design and 
Construction; Civil Engineering and Roads and Earthworks. It is a company that has 
undergone a series of mergers, the most significant of which occurred in 1995 with Ovcon 
and resulted in the name WBHO Construction (Pty) Ltd. In that same year (1995), WBHO 
was one of the first firms to take an active step towards transformation through its 
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empowerment company, Rainbow Construction. This put WBHO ahead of the pack with 
regards to engaging with black business, a strategy that would prove useful for all firms. 
As illustrated in the timeline above, in 2001, WBHO entered the Australian market by 
acquiring 40% of ProBuild Constructions, a leading mid-range building contractor in 
Melbourne, Australia. This expansion has contributed significantly to the group’s revenue 
stream, particularly during its most trying years after 2010. The firm has however been able 
to widen its service offering, seeking a competitive edge as the ‘one stop contractor’ it 
markets itself to be.  
5.2.3 Basil Read 
 
Figure 6: Basil Read Timeline 
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Involved in construction, 
mining, development and 
engineering, specialising in 
civil engineering, road 





mining, blasting operations 
and engineering design, 
procurement and 
construction management. 
• South Africa,  
• Sub-Saharan 
Africa 





Source: Gauteng Growth Development Agency, 2015 
 
Perhaps what is most striking about the Basil Read story is its brief interaction with Group 
Five. When Basil Read employees took part in a plan to “reclaim” their independence soon 
after Darling and Hodgeson had restructured construction related activities at Group Five, it 
was an announcement that rocked the industry, attracting considerable media attention 
(Basil Read, 2015). Their desire to preserve their identity is what motivated the directors of 
Basil Read to buy themselves out from Group Five and three years later; the company was 
able to present its first report as a publically listed company.  
One, therefore, looks at the evolving story of Basil Read, through a better understanding of 
the complex nature that the group has progressed internally, while in the midst of political 
changes taking place in SA at the time. What makes the story more compelling is how the 
two firms intertwine for a time, yet both remain giants in the industry. 
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5.2.4 Group Five 
Figure 7: Group Five Timeline 
 
Source: Group Five Annual Reports, 1994-2014 
 
Table 17: Group Five Overview 
Synopsis Geographic Footprint Staff 
Compliment 
Annual Revenue 
The largest cluster in 
the Group Five group 
of companies and is 
involved in heavy 
construction. 
• Southern Africa 






♦ Building & Housing: R3,331.8m 
♦ Civil Engineering: R3,354.2m 
♦ Projects: R1,717.7m 
(2012) 
Source: Gauteng Growth Development Agency, 2015 
 
Although Group Five is the ‘youngest’ firm and perhaps the least ‘family oriented’ among this 
group of companies, it has managed to attain great success in the industry as discussed in 
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As one might have noticed in the milestones of each company as detailed above, it 
was through a series of mergers and acquisition30 that took place in the late 1980s and into 
the early 1990s that these firms had begun establishing themselves as industry giants. Their 
core growth strategies at the time were partially motivated by the fears of uncertainty about 
their futures in South Africa with the emergence of a new governing elite. By setting 
themselves up as ‘the builders of a new South Africa’, they could showcase themselves as 
indispensable, efficient and capable of being relevant in a new dispensation, as will be 
discussed.  
Although largely similar, their strategies had slight differing characteristics, most notably in 
their moves in the late 1990s, to how they have gone about addressing each of the elements 
of the sector scorecard. These are aspects that the detailed step-by-step discussion further 
seeks to address. 
For a logical flow in the discussion, in the following two chapters, I distinguish between three 
phases of empowerment over the last two decades. These phases act as navigators, 
steering the discussion of each firm, starting with Murray & Roberts. 
The first phase (1994-2000) saw empowerment characterised by ownership deals taking 
place31 “while legislation (not specifically referred to as empowerment legislation) was 
enacted to address issues of employment equity, labour rights and skills development”, 
without the presence of an over-arching framework or legislation (Ponte, Roberts and van 
Sittert, 2007). Additionally, this phase saw the appointment of black individuals onto board 
membership positions. The issue facing empowerment deals during this period were the 
sustainability of the funding mechanism used in the deals, as most black people did not have 
sufficient capital or collateral to offer.  
During the second phase (2001-2009) the B-BBEE Act, along with the Codes of Good 
Practice (which were mandated by the Act) came to completion, thus began their 
enforcement and implementation. As previously discussed, to accompany this formalised 
legislative framework and its associated codes; councils and committees for certain key 
                                                             
30 Refer to Appendix C for large mergers and acquisitions conducted by the firms  
3131 The landmark that marked this first wave is a BEE deal where Sanlam via Sankorp sold its controlling interest in 
Metropolitan Life (Metlife) to the Black shareholders of Metlife Investment Holdings (Methold), a consortium formed by 
prominent Black businesspeople and community leaders. The consortium eventually became New Africa Investments 
Limited (Nail). In time, Nail grew into one of the largest Black-owned publicly traded companies. By the end of 1998, it has a 
market capitalization of approximately R6 billion.  
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industries were set up to draft specific empowerment charters that would be the basic for 
which an industry approached and measured transformation. For the construction sector, the 
Construction Sector B-BBEE Charter was enacted and finalised in 2009, ready for 
implementation in 2010. This phase is thus characterised by the formalisation of B-BBEE, 
with businesses finding ways to address the generic scorecard requirements. 
The on-going third phase (since 2010) sees the commencement of the implementation of 
these specific industry charters, in particular, the construction sector charter. As an analysis 
of the third phase, I compare results of the firms’ achievements vis-à-vis the sector 
scorecard.  
 For this paper, the evaluation of the third phase spans from 2010-2014.  
Taking all the above into consideration, the following analysis shows that as with the change 
in political, social and economic times, corporate strategies within the firms changed 
accordingly, although there are differences in the strategies employed by each firm as they 
respond to B-BBEE.  
 
5.3.2 Murray & Robert’s First and Second Phase 
 
 Murray & Robert’s First Phase (1994-2000) 
As the second biggest construction firm in South Africa, Murray & Roberts has been 
operational within the domestic market for over 100 years. The dawn of democracy came 
with a great deal of uncertainty for big business across the country, and those operating in 
the construction sector were no exception. This sense of anxiety and uncertainty is 
expressed in the 1996 Murray & Roberts annual report where former group chairperson 
Dave Brink states, “ Life has changed in South Africa and will change a lot more in the near 
future. Whether it gets worse or better will depend on the extent to which we are prepared to 
engage the process of building something better. As yet, insufficient South Africans are 
engaged constructively in improving life for themselves and their communities, and until the 
vast majority of us are doing that, we cannot become a winning nation.” (Murray & Roberts 
Annual Report, 1996).  
It was with this thinking that the firm embarked on what it labeled its “Transitions and 
Renewals Theme” as its planned approach for a better footing in the industry. This plan 
which was set in motion in 1996, included the objective of achieving revenues from offshore 
activities worth 20% of total turnover by 1998. Under the leadership of then CEO, Graham 
Hardy, the group was determined to strategically engage as best it could with the new 
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government to meet infrastructural demand, but was also equally interested in diversifying its 
business territory beyond South Africa's borders. Strategic expansion focused on Africa, the 
Middle East and to a lesser extent Australasia and the Pacific Rim (Murray & Roberts Annual 
Report, 1998). This was also to strategically minimize any risk that would be brought about 
by the 1999 national elections that would see the retirement of President Nelson Mandela, 
who was revered greatly. Large companies feared that his retirement would unsettle the 
domestic market, thus one finds that aggressive expansion offshore took place at a rapid 
pace back then.  
In so far as engaging with empowerment or any internal transformation, Murray & Roberts 
seems to have been thoroughly disengaged during those five years.  The only hint of some 
discussion around transformation objectives is their stated commitment to support “capacity 
building within South African society with particular emphasis on education and teacher 
training”, without any clarity on how they had planned to go about ensuring this (Murray & 
Roberts Annual Report, 1998). Additionally, the appointment of Brigalia Bam as the first 
black female non-executive director in 1998 was a vague sign of some reform in its 
governing structures.  
 
Murray & Roberts Second Phase (2000-2009) 
At the turn of the century major changes began to take place at the group, as black 
empowerment becomes a topical subject across the country and the private sector is 
pressured by government to participate more formally and broadly. Two significant strategic 
moves are made by the firm to address this issue, namely, the appointment of black 
executives and a BEE transaction in 2005.  
As a conspicuous starting move, the firm appoints highly politically connected black 
individuals as independent non-executive directors to its board. The two most noticeable of 
these from the case of Murray & Roberts are Saki Macozoma and Eddie Funde, assuming 
board positions in 2001 and 2000, respectively.  
Saki Macozoma, former non-executive director at Murray & Roberts, spent five years on 
Robben Island alongside Nelson Mandela for his activities in anti-apartheid movements. 
Arguably one of South Africa’s richest black men, Saki Macozoma is a name is well known in 
high-ranking business and political networks throughout the country. He holds stakes in 
industries such as construction, the financial services and insurance. With interests in public 
companies such as Liberty and Standard Bank, Macozoma’s net worth is said to stretch 
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beyond $70 million. Macozoma along with Imogen Mkhize32 were part of a task team that set 
up the Broad-Based BEE measurement criteria between 2001 and 2003 while both served 
on the board of Murray & Roberts. Macozoma’s rise to business came when he emerged as 
one of the defenders of the ANC’s change in economic policy from the nationalisation 
policies that they advocated for, for over 30 years, in favour of more conservative 
economics. Although government at the time was hesitant to ideologically justify its ‘new 
economics’, Macozoma stood as one of the few that was unapologetic about the South 
Africa’s capitalist path and was often cited as saying that “creating a black bourgeoisie 
necessarily creates economic equality, and that is a normal consequence of capitalism” 
(Ventures Africa, 2012). With such a mind-set, Macozoma was undoubtedly an asset to any 
firm operating in a predominantly white industry and was set on establishing itself  in an 
entirely new operational space. 
One the other hand there is former Eskom director Sonwabo “Eddie” Funde, who joined the 
Murray & Roberts’s board in the year 2000. As an ex-political exile, serving 20 years in ANC 
organisational structures, Funde was Chief Representative for the ANC in Australia and the 
Pacific, as well as head of the commission assigned to reshape the ANC Youth League. 
Additionally, he was close friends with Max Sisulu, the former Speaker of the National 
Assembly, serving under President Zuma’s first term of presidency. Funde served on the 
board of Murray & Roberts during its most triumphant period (2000-2008) with its expansion 
into Australia, its win of various tenders for the building of FIFA 2010 World Cup 
infrastructure, as well as its win of the tender to construct the Medupi and Kusile power 
stations for Eskom. During this period, he was also serving as a member of the board of 
directors of Eskom Holdings Limited. 
Below is a table tabulating all other black executives to have served on the board of Murray 
& Roberts over the last two decades.  
Table 18: Murray & Roberts Black Executives 
Name Position in 
Executive 
Years served Other business interest 
and board memberships 
Political 
Affiliation 
Saki Macozoma Non-executive 
Director 
2001-2006 Liberty Holdings, 
Volkswagen, Standard 











                                                             
32 Mkhize also sat on the board of M&R as an independent non-executive director from 2005-2010 
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Name Position in 
Executive 
Years served Other business interest 

















2000-2008 Eskom Holdings Limited, 
SABC, Independent 
Development Trust (IDT) 
ANC 
Dr Namane Magau Non-executive 
Director 
2004-2012 Thebe Investment, Simmer 
and Jack Mines Limited, 
Merrill Lynch South Africa 
Limited, National Research 
Foundation (NRF), SABC, 
Business & Development 
Solutions Pty Ltd, Advisory 
Board UCT Business 






2007-2012 Former President and CEO 
Council for 
Scientific and Industrial 
Research. Chairman of 








2009-2011 Eskom, Angle Alpha, AECI 
and Karabo Engineering 
Undisclosed 
Mahlape Sello Non-executive 
chairman 
2013-present 
(started off as a 
non-executive 
director in 2009) 







2013-present PPC Limited, Nthake 
Consulting, African Bank 
Investments Ltd 
Undisclosed 
Thenjiwe Chikane Non-executive 
Diector 
2012 Nedbank Group, Nedbank 
Limited, Datacentrix 
Holdings, Telkom and 
the Institute of Directors 
and a trustee 
of AfricaRice. 
Undisclosed 
Source: Murray & Roberts Annual Reports: 1994-2014 
 
The table above illustrates that of the ten black executives to have served on the board of 
Murray & Roberts, 6 of them were appointed during this period, and only one individual has 
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been named as an executive director. Also quite interesting to note is that most individuals 
on this board appear to be closely aligned with South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC. 
The second move during this period was the conclusion of a B-BBEE transaction in 
September 2005. Murray & Roberts announced an R494-million investment extending its 
BEE partnerships to a broad base of staff and community organisations. According to its 
then CEO, Brian Bruce the objective of the empowerment strategy was to achieve greater 
than 25% broad-based, direct black ownership in Murray & Roberts by 2010 (Ryan and 
Lambert, 2006). The initiative saw 10% of Murray & Roberts Holdings shareholding 
transferred to four trusts and resulted in 9.4% direct black ownership. Moreover, the 
investment was said to be an “investment in the Murray & Roberts business strategy” (Ryan 
and Lambert, 2006). 
The first trust was a general staff trust that received approximately 4.9-million shares to the 
value of about R74-million with a minimum expected dividend payment of about R2-million a 
year based on the current dividend per share. The second, a black employee benefits trust 
was structured the same as the first with the exception that it received approximately 6,6-
million shares valued at about R99-million, while the third, a community trust received 
approximately 11,6-million shares, valued at about R173-million, with a minimum expected 
dividend payment of about R5-million a year. With a women empowerment focus, the 
beneficiaries of the community trust were selected from broad-based black women’s 
groupings. The fourth trust, funded by Murray & Roberts through an interest free loan was a 
black executive trust that received approximately 9.9-million shares valued at about R148-
million. Its beneficiaries were to be black top, senior and middle management as per the 
definitions of the Employee Equity Act. With its objective being to enable Murray & Roberts 
to attract and preserve top-skilled staff, this particular trust was a form of an employee 
incentive scheme. 
 
5.3.3 WBHO’s First and Second Phase 
 
 WBHO first phase (1994-2000) 
WBHO is arguably the first of the four firms to embark on a journey towards including 
transformation imperatives as part of its objectives. In 1995, together with Thebe Investment 
Corporation33 and various independent builders from Soweto, Wilson Bailey Homes - as it 
                                                             
33 Thebe Investment Corporation is a black-owned South African investment company that manages assets worth over R6 
billion. Integral to its establishment is Vusi Khanyile, who left the ANC to become Thebe’s first CEO, a position he still 
maintains. Thebe’s sole shareholder at the time was the Batho Batho Trust, which included original Trustees Nelson 
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was known at the time - established Rainbow Construction. Within eight years of operation, 
this empowerment company was recognized as the leading black empowerment 
construction company in the country (Leads2Business, n.d). During its first few years, 
WBHO partnered with Rainbow Construction on a few projects of national importance, 
however by 1998 the firm had begun to tender for contracts independently, proving able to 
secure big contracts34 (Leads2Business, n.d). The partnership between WBHO and Rainbow 
Construction has proven to be significantly beneficial to both parties, especially since they 
were conducted through the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). One such project 
was the building of the headquarters for the DTI, which saw the collaboration of WBHO, 
Rainbow Construction and three other entities, namely, Rebserve/Propnet Facilities 
Management joint venture, Atterbury/Parkdev Property Development joint venture, and 
Zwelinzima Holdings (eProp Commercial Property News, 2004).  Such a contract placed 
WBHO on higher ground during a time when government infrastructural projects were 
scarce.  
Rainbow Construction thus became the vehicle through which WBHO was able to 
simultaneously address empowerment targets without ‘jeopardizing’ shareholder wants and 
intelligently secure some major public and public sector projects. Moreover, by partnering 
with Rainbow Construction, it was able to reach numerous domestic goals without carrying 
all the risk, allowing it to focus on its international expansion aspirations. As arguably its only 
significant step towards addressing empowerment and transformation during this period, it is 
one that is illustrative of WBHO’S forward thinking ability, in that it was able to establish 
relationships with black empowerment ventures much sooner than it had become actual 
state policy. 
 
WBHO’s Second Phase (2001-2009) 
Relations between WBHO and Rainbow Construction continued into this period, with the two 
companies working together on projects such as the refurbishment of the South African 
Reserve Bank headquarters in Pretoria (WBHO Annual Report, 2002). Perhaps the most 
notable development in this period was the finalisation of its BEE transaction in September 
2006.  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Mandela (Chairman), Walter Sisulu, Reverend Beyers Naudé and Enos Mabuza. Their current investment portfolio spans 
tourism, mining resources, infrastructure, renewable energy, financial services and healthcare.  
34 Rainbow Construction predominately operates in the Gauteng province and has managed to secure a number of high-
profile contracts through the use of PPPs. Among them was a 50-50 joint venture with WBHO to construct the constitutional 
court, and another was a contract to build the Freedom Park Monument at Salvokop, outside Pretoria, also with WBHO, as 
was the contract to construct a casino for Emerald Safari Resorts on the Vaal.  
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This “Black Empowerment Equity Initiative” (WBHO Annual Report, 2006) saw WBHO issue 
15% of its share capital to Akani Investment Holdings, a BEE consortium. Akani was made 
up of three individuals, namely, James Ngobeni, Nonhlanhla Mjoli-Mncube and Savannah 
Maziya, who were all named the first independent black non-executive directors of WBHO in 
2007. WBHO CEO, Mike Wylie and Ngobeni were at the time also joint chairpersons of the 
committee that was tasked to establish and develop the sector’s empowerment charter. 
Additionally, deputy chairwoman of the CIDB at the time was Mjoli-Mncube, while Maziya sat 
on its board. All the individuals presently remain on the company board as independent non-
executive directors. Tabulated below are black executives at WBHO over the last two 
decades. 
Table 19: WBHO Black Executives 
















9 Sycom Property Fund Managers 
Limited, Matingi and Associates, 
MAMOET Southern Africa (Pty) 
Limited, Rand Airport (Germiston), 
Matingi & Associates CC and The 









9 Tongaat Hulett Limited, Capitec 
Bank Holdings Limited, Poineer 
Food Group Limited, Founder of 








9 Bunengi Holdings, African 
Broadcast Network, Rainbow 







6 Hulamin Limited, Cadiz Holdings 
Limited 
Undisclosed 
Source: WBHO Annual Reports: 1994-2014 
 
What sets WBHO apart is that its directorate is without any clear political affiliation. Instead, 
all its black board executives have some prior experience in the industry through their 
educational backgrounds and working experience. Their empowerment transaction thus 
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ushered in the first black individuals on the company board, and secondly, resulted in an 
operation that enabled black people to become company shareholders, with 2 000 000 
shares belonging to the new black partners and another 4 500 000 shares placed in a 
WBHO Broad-Based Share Initiative Trust. 
 
5.3.4  Group Five’s First and Second Phase  
 
Group Five first phase (1994-2000) 
After trolling media outlets, annual reports and academic sources one finds little evidence 
that Group Five was ever involved in substantial transformation and empowerment initiatives 
at the start of this era. There was, however, a great deal of mentions in their media 
statements and reports in 1996 of ‘affirmative action’ and ‘empowerment’, under the ideals 
that the firm would have liked to pursue (Group Five Annual Report, 1996). Tangible action 
was yet to be taken. In 1998, the firm began working with empowerment partners for water 
supply projects in the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape Provinces, which supported smaller 
contractors in those provinces. Moreover, Group Five began to establish joint venture 
partnerships with historically disadvantaged entrepreneurs. 
In 1999 Umthubi Construction was established, a black construction partnership company 
that Group Five has 80% shareholding over (Group Five Annual Report, 1999). Noticeably, 
the firm seemed more concerned with ensuring its adherence to new legislation such as the 
Employment Equity Act, as well other health and safety requirements. 
 
Group Five’s Second Phase (2001-2009) 
Much like the other firms, Group Five also picked up on its empowerment and transformation 
initiatives at the turn of the 21st century. Moving rather rapidly, it initiated a deal which would 
result in over a quarter of their shares belonging to black partners.  
As one of the industry leaders as far as ownership empowerment deals were concerned, 
one milestone of Group Five is their conclusion of a BBEE transaction that resulted in 26.1% 
of its enlarged share capital being made available to black South Africans in September 
2005. One element of the transaction was a broad-based employee scheme for all 
employees. However 90% were black. It was a once off issue of shares with no vesting 
period. The second element was a black manager’s scheme that constituted 1.94% of share 
capital and would benefit black managers in senior roles. These shares were issued to black 
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managers annually and are held in a share trust. Of the 26.1%, the largest beneficiaries and 
final element of the transaction were iLima consortium and the Mvelaphanda Group Limited.  
As a consortium of two broad-based empowerment entities, the presence of iLima and 
Mvelaphanda would result in Group Five having a direct black ownership of 26.1% with 
immediate voting and economic rights (Mokopanele, 2005). Moreover in an announcement 
made by an economic empowerment rating agency, Empowerdex, the transaction would 
have given Group Five a score of more than 80% for the ownership component in the 
scorecard (Mokopanele, 2005).  
Simultaneously during this period, the firm gained a total of 11 black executives (both 
executive and non-executive), three of which were executive directors, thus working on the 
day-to-day activities of the business at the most senior level. What one finds rather unique 
about the black board members to have served on the board of Group Five is that some of 
them are non-South African. More specifically, three black independent non-executive 
directors have come from neighboring countries, namely, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Zambia, 
while the current company secretary is from Swaziland. This inclusivity and integration were 
a feature in the firm’s overall strategy to rapidly expand into the region as it sought to begin 
to better capture gains in these markets during this time35.  
Below is a comprehensive list of all black directors to have served on the board of Group 
Five since 1994. 
Table 20: Group Five Black Executives 
Name Position in 
Executive 










1999-2002 Chairperson of Ilizwi Industrial 
Holdings, Phalaborwa Mining 
Company, Khuthele Projects (Pty) 








2002-2007 Chair at EnviroServ Holdings Ltd, 
Stewart Scott International, Bohlweki 
Environmental and the 
Bakwena Concession Company. 










Anglo American Company, Mwana 
Africa, LTA Limited, African Business 
Round Table. 
Undisclosed 
                                                             
35 Further details on firm strategies are discussed in the next chapter (chapter 6).  
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Name Position in 
Executive 














(Joined as a 
non-executive in 
2007) 
National Empowerment Fund, 
Sanlam Life Insurance Limited, 






2006 Sasol, Nova Capital Africa, Impala 
Platinum Holdings, African 
Development Bank, iLima-Mvela 
consortium 
Undisclosed 
Nosisa Kekana Company 
Secretary 




2009-2013 PetroSA, Woolworths, Sea Harvest 









2009 Amhold (Pty) Ltd; Chair: Biz Africa 
(270) (Pty) Ltd; CEO: Saccawu 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd,  
Mvelaphanda Group, TFMC and 
Royal Sechaba 
Assumed ANC 
Junaid Allie Executive 
Director 





2009-present Sekunjalo Investments Limited Undisclosed 
Themba Mosia Executive 
Director 





2014-present Safika Holdings (pty) Ltd, Nedbank 
Group, Barloworld Ltd, Impala 
Platinum Holdings Ltd, Clover 














2014-present Co-founder and chairperson of 
Catalyst Principal Partners 
Undisclosed 
Source: Group Five Annual Reports: 1994-2014 
 
                                                             
36 Mthethwa is married to South African politician and ANC member, Nkosinathi “Nathi” Mthethwa. He currently serves as 
the South African Minister of Arts and Culture.   
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Within less than five years of its finalization, the BEE transaction deal between Group Five 
and iLama collapsed in 2009. According to then CEO Mike Upton, “iLima had not fulfilled 
certain conditions and had breached certain terms to which the original deal was subject” 
(Mpofu, 2009). Nonetheless even in its absence, the group managed to retain its overall 
level 2 B-BBEE certification, due to the performance of other elements. In an attempt to 
mitigate any loses suffered as a result of the unwinding of the transaction, Group Five 
ensured that the value of the shares would be recouped by having iLima return the shares to 
Group Five with no financial effect on the year’s earnings (Mpofu, 2009). Moreover, the 
reversal of that transaction did not impact on Group Five's other BEE transactions involving 
Mvelaphanda or the Group Five BEE management and staff schemes.  
 
5.3.5 Basil Read’s First and Second Phase 
 
Basil Read first phase (1994-2000) 
The transition into a new, democratic South Africa came less than ten years after Basil Read 
had bought itself out of Group Five. Having broken away from Group Five in mid-1984, Basil 
Read managed to revive itself rather quickly, rapidly competing with leaders in the industry 
and soon becoming an industry giant as well.  Of the 380 Basil Read employees who were 
involved in the buyout, 125 of those were black staff members, a move that would prove to 
be strategically genius. Due to the involvement of black employees in this transaction, Basil 
Read was able to leverage off this status as a diverse, integrated firm as the country went to 
democracy. In its 1996 annual report, company CEO Géard Perceau remarked, “We see 
empowerment not only as a means of addressing past inequalities but also as an integral 
part of enhancing the overall capacity and competitiveness of the industry” (Basil Read 
Annual Report, 1996). 
 As a course of action, Basil Read began with a literacy initiative that introduced numeracy 
and literacy classes to disadvantaged employees. Additionally, the firm spent over R2 million 
on the up-skilling and training of its workers to various positions, including equipping some 
employees with business administration qualifications. Thus, during this period, the firm 
engaged with and addressed what it conceptualized at the time as ‘affirmative action’ 
through investments in the education, training and development of employees. Much like 
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Basil Read Second Phase (2001-2009) 
It was only in 2002 that Basil Read welcomed the first black non-executive director on its 
board, although she only served on the board for a year before later serving on the board of 
Stefanutti Stocks, a large competitor of Basil Read in the industry. Although not directly 
dealing with the elements of the scorecard and BEE for some years, nor having any 
involvement in the drafting of the B-BBEE Act or CSC, these were their first step towards 
serious engagement with high level empowerment.  
The most substantial contribution towards an empowerment objective taken by Basil Read 
was in 2005. The BEE transaction conducted was not only colossal in that it would result in 
the company becoming the first truly black owned large and listed construction company, but 
it also meant the Basil Read would no longer have a foreign owned holding company. As a 
majority shareholder in Basil Read for almost 20 years, Bouyues Travaux Publics SA37 had 
control over the business, often electing Frenchmen to the most senior position in the firm, 
including that of CEO. Therefore through a Bouygues’ sale of 51.9% of Basil Read shares to 
a consortium of Amabubesi Investments and Metallon Ventures Proprietary Limited, Basil 
Read became a largely black owned JSE listed construction company. The deal was struck 
at a price of 82cents a share, with a loan of 12% per annum to buy the shares (Mail and 
Gaurdian, 2006).  Metallon further sold its share in the market and to black shareholders 
including Amabubesi, Bulelani Ngcuka and Khaya Ngqula in May 2006. By 2006, Basil Read 
had a 41% black shareholding.  
Having sealed the deal with Amabubesi and Metallon, Basil Read welcomed seven black 
directors on its board between 2006 and 2007. This resulted in a board composition of 75% 
black individuals, one of whom was a black female. The table below illustrates all black 
executives to have served on the board of Basil Read over the last two decades.  
Table 21: Basil Read Black Executives 
  Name Position in 
Executive 




Nomhle Canca Non-executive 
Director 
2002-2003 CEO of One Stone Capital, 
non-executive director at 
Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd, 
Primedia 
Undisclosed 
Bulelani Ngcuka Non-executive 
Chairman 
2005-2009 City  Lodge Hotels Limited, 
Amabubesi Investments, Vuwa 
Holdings, Former Chief Whip of 
the ANC 




                                                             
37 Bouygues Travaux Publics SA bought 25% of Basil Read in 1993, increasing shareholding to 70% by 2002. 
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  Name Position in 
Executive 




Lungisa Dyosi Non-executive 
Director 
2006-2010 Strategic and legal adviser to 
the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Amabubesi 
Investments (Pty) Ltd, co-







2005-2008 Metallon Group, South African 
Consulate in New York City. 
Currently executive director of 
Volkswagen South Africa, 
Rhodes University Foundation, 







2006-present Founding member of Sizwe 
Ntsaluba, Amabubesi 
Investments and Neotel, serves 
on the boards of; National 
Energy Regulator of South 
Africa (NERSA) and National 
Housing Finance Corporation 
(NHFC). 
ANC 
Andile Reve Non-executive 
Director 
2006 Rennies Group, IDC, Metallon 
Group 
 
Sindile Peteni Non-executive 
Chairman 
2009-2014 




Founding member and director 
of Thebe Investment 
Corporation. Active 
member of the ANC, assisting 








2007-present Director of Thebe Investment 
Corporation, CEO at the Don 
Group, Chairman of the 








2007-2011 Founder Pamwe Consulting, 
holds directorships in Maluleke 






2009-2012 SizweNtsaluba VSP, director of 








2009-2012  Undisclosed 
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  Name Position in 
Executive 










2009 SABC, Minister in the Free 
State Province government, 






2012-2014 CFO; Eskom Pension and 
Provident Fund, audit 
committee of the Department of 

















Development Bank of Southern 
Africa (DBSA), former 









2013-present Chairperson of the SIOC 
Community Development Trust, 
chief executive officer of Kabo 
Capital, former group chief 
executive officer of Johnnic 
Communications 
Limited (Johncom), serves as 
director on the boards of 
African Media and 
Entertainment Limited 
(Chairman), Caxton and CTP 
Publishers and 
Printers Limited and 
Continental Coal Limited 
Undisclosed 
Andiswa Ndoni Company 
Secretary 







2014 De Beers group Undisclosed 
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Interestingly, of all four firms, Basil Read has had the largest number of black executives on 
its board as well as the most female representation at the executive level.  
 
 An Analysis of Board Membership Composition 5.4
 
One finds that from these observations there is something more to be said about the 
caliber of black individuals who assume roles on these company boards. Since the early 
1990s, South Africa’s ‘black capitalists’ have been heavily criticized and the trend remains so 
today. They have been perceived as lacking of independence and risen to ‘expedient 
structures’ so as to be used as tools for the old establishment. Some have gone so far as 
accusing them of seeking membership in previously ‘white boys clubs’, as well as falling 
squarely into the syndrome of ‘white faces, black masks’ (Randall, 1996). According to this 
argument, the result has been that these black capitalists are not genuine capitalists at all 
but instead have surrounded themselves with white consultants and advisors who run the 
companies, while senior black managers are hired for their compliance and corporate 
brochures to improve company image and public relations. These stereotypes are often 
levelled at black capitalists everywhere else in Africa. Randall (1996) writes that “in the place 
of self-standing, viable capitalist class, an unproductive group of pseudo-capitalists have 
emerged, dependent on political connections and rent-seeking activities for their survival”. 
 
In this paper one can identify two ‘types’ of aspiring black capital elites from the tables 
above. 
1. Former activists 
 In this category, we find those who hold the so-called ‘political standing in the 
community’. These were perhaps the most sought after individuals in the first 
years of South Africa’s democracy, as it included those with ‘Robben Island’ 
credentials. In these top construction companies, much like all other big 
businesses throughout the country, it is not difficult to find good illustrations of 
this, such as Saki Macozoma and Bulelani Nguka38. One concludes that most 
                                                             
38 Bulelani Ngcuka, former chairman of Basil Read till 2009 obtained his LLB degree through UNISA while in prison for his 
political involvements during the apartheid struggle. Before his involvement in the private sector, Ngcuka who is married to 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was Chief Whip of the ANC from 1994-1997 and was later elected to the position of permanent 
Deputy Chair of the National Council of Provinces (NPO). Ngcuka is arguably well- known for his role in spearheading the 
criminal charges against Jacob Zuma as the head of South Africa’s National Directorate of Public Prosecutions which saw 
the eventual removal of Zuma as South Africa’s deputy president. 
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former activists had neither the capital nor received the financial or technical 
training while fewer had the opportunity to learn hard-core business skills. 
Both Macozoma and Ngcuka have ‘struggle credentials’, but, more 
importantly, the political leverage to assist any business, in any industry to be 
part of the correct network that allows for it to do business with the 
government. 
2. Educated exiles 
 Feasibly the second most prominent individuals would be from this group 
made up of returned exiles, who although might not be as well connected as 
the Islanders, are often educated with solid knowledge on business or even 
have backgrounds in working in business. This group also includes those that 
benefitted from overseas educational opportunities through bursaries made 
available to black youth, particularly after the Soweto uprisings in June 1976. 
Even though only a handful managed to study technical or purely commercial 
subjects, while others took short diplomas, their external education 
distinguished them from their peers who had been in Bantu education schools 
(Browning, 1989, Randall, 1996 and Chabane et al, 2006). This distinction 
made them attractive candidates for empowerment endeavours of white 
business. One such individual is Dr, Namane Magau – former non-executive 
director at Murray & Roberts and Vusi Mavimbela, former non-executive 
director of Group Five39. There is also Philisiwe Mthethwa40, who is the 
current chairperson of the Group Five board of directors.  
 
Contrary to the standard narrative there is a third “type” of black capitalist that has emerged 
over the last two decades within the South African private sector. Shortly after the Soweto 
uprising came the development of the Sullivan code - a set of principals set up by African-
                                                             
39 Magau benefited from an educational exchange in the U.S during the apartheid era. Dr Magau was educated at Harvard 
University and is currently the founder and CEO of Business & Development Solutions Pty Ltd. Vusi Mavimbela is the 
current Director General in The Presidency. Mavimbela was appointed as a non-executive director at Group Five in 2006, 
while employed as an executive Director at Mvelapanda Holdings Pty Ltd. Having left  the country in 1976 to join the ANC in 
exile, Mavimbela was able to obtain diplomas in Moscow during his time abroad. He remained highly involved in the political 
arena upon his return to South Africa, rising to political advisor in the office of Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, before he 
turned his eye to business. He is therefore a both a political heavyweight and educated exile. 
40 Philisiwe Mthethwa (nee Buthelezi), the chairperson of Group Five is yet another example. Mthethwa, the current CEO of 
the National Empowerment Fund holds a MSC in Economics from the University of Paris, Sorbonne and an MBA from the 
UK. Mthethwa has climbed high up the corporate ranks, with numerous accolades such as Africa’s Business Woman of the 
year in 2011 to mention but one. It is interesting to note that in 2008 by bringing in Mthethwa, a black female as its board 
chairperson, Group Five as was able to increase black board representation to 50%. 
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American preacher and civil rights leader Rev Leon Sullivan, which aimed to apply economic 
pressure on South Africa in protest of the apartheid system. The principals set out to ensure 
that American companies with operations in South Africa promoted racial equality in all 
employment practises (Randall, 1996). The principals were in direct conflict with South 
African policies of racial segregation, with the code strongly emphasising the promotion of 
black people into management and supervisory positions. However with growing 
international pressure towards the end of the 1980s, companies reluctantly began to pursue 
‘black advancement’ and ‘equal opportunity’, enabling some blacks to enter into white 
corporate managerial structures in large South African. Given the dearth of formal technical 
and financial training among black people at the time, the tendency was to offer them non-
operational ‘soft’ positions in human resources, marketing and public relations (Randall, 
1996).   
From the data depicted in tables 13 to 16 one finds that of the ten black directors to have sat 
on the board of Murray & Roberts over the twenty year period, only one of them was an 
executive director. Similarly, Group Five has had two black executive directors over the 
same period, while the other 11 black directors to occupy spaces on its board have been in 
none-executive positions. Basil Read, on the other hand, has had three black executive 
directors and 13 non-executive directors over the twenty year period while WBHO is yet to 
have a black executive director.  
Interestingly, in evaluating each of the examined companies, one finds that no black 
individuals have evolved from within these firms to obtain positions on the board. Rather, 
how most people from previously disadvantaged backgrounds have made it onto these 
boards or executive committees as directors is due to their involvement in either a BEE 
ownership/shareholding transaction or heads of subsidiaries belonging to the groups. Edwin 
Mashishi, currently the only black executive committee member at WBHO is the CEO of 
Edwin Construction Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of the group. Mandla Gantsho’s appointment as 
non-executive director at Group Five in 2007 was a result of the group’s ownership deal in 
2005 according to the company’s 2007 annual report.  
Elia Louw Nel, current CEO of WBHO has been with the firm since 1987 and has held his 
current position since 2008. Mike Lomas, former CEO of Group Five joined the firm in 1978, 
rising to eventually become its CEO, while Henry Laas, current CEO of Murray & Roberts 
has worked within its management structure for over 14 years. The evolution of black 
ownership and black management has not come from the development and progress of 
blacks from within the firm while the opposite is true for white people. A majority of their most 
senior positions, including departmental heads, are held by individuals who have gained 
their workplace experience from that particular firm. In the most senior decision making 
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positions neither CEO nor CFO/Financial Director have ever been black. It is worth 
emphasising therefore that the industry remains dominated by white (mostly Afrikaans 
speaking) males, both at a managerial level as well as at the ownership structures. What is 
clear is that it was easier for these firms to link themselves up with the appropriate ‘black’ 
empowerment groups, though the sale of equity or including them at board level during 
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 The Third Phase (2001-2014)  5.5
 
5.5.1 Challenges in Methodology  
 
In determining the targets obtained by each firm, one finds that there were three 
challenges and limitations in the methodology followed by the two subsequent chapters, 
namely; 
 
1. Information gathering  
The biggest challenge at the outset was the absence of reliable data on the industry state of 
empowerment; however the scorecards of each enterprise offer enough information.  
 
2.  Absence of reliable data  
This was further compounded by the reluctance in the availability of information by 
verification agencies citing confidentiality clauses with their clients (the construction 
companies).  
 
3.  Insufficient data in the scorecard  
Instead of detailed scorecards outlining the detail of scores per elements of the CSC, 
enterprises largely release B-BBEE certificates that merely indicate the B-BBEE level 
contribution of the measured entities and the rating of each element. One, therefore, relies 
greatly on the attempts by industry bodies to publish data as well as the media for these 
scorecards. However following an interview with the Basil Read transformation and 
employment equity manager, I was able to obtain the detailed scorecards41 from Basil Read, 
which aids in understanding which areas a company may be lagging in. Data obtained from 
these reports has been incorporated into this study. 
 
5.5.2 B-BBEE Score Comparison 
 
The finalization of the CSC resulted in a systematic change in how major players in this 
sector viewed empowerment. Ownership and management changes, procurement 
requirements, enterprise development and skills development initiatives, adherence to 
employment equity and arbitrary CSI programmes were to be brought together and 
accounted for under one scorecard that was specifically designed for the industry. A trend 
                                                             
41 formerly known as the BBBEE Assessment Report 
 
Page | 73  
 
begins to emerge, seen through the changes in the annual reporting style as well as the core 
values of each of the firms. The annual reports and company progress statements released 
in the media exude a new nascent set of principles as employment equity, affirmative action, 
transformation and diversity become frequent in the language of reporting. The core values 
of each enterprise begin to include phrases such as; 
1) “The formation of partnerships with persons and companies from previously 
disadvantaged sectors of our society” (WBHO Annual Report, 2003), 
2)  Core focus areas have become the pursuit of “black economic 
empowerment” and accelerated progress in targeted employment equity 
levels (Group Five Annual Report, 2003) and 
3)  “Enhancing diversity within the workplace” (Murray & Roberts Annual 
Report, 2002).  
The seriousness with which government was taking the transformation project was 
becoming too formidable a force to ignore. Although B-BBEE was, and remains a voluntary 
directive for enterprises, for those whose primary revenue stream flows from government 
tendering processes, refusing to adhere to it would have a ghastly impact on enterprise 
performance. Any construction company that is to do business with the state is, therefore 
‘compelled’ to ensure that its house is in order, by carefully adhering to the set targets. 
Hence, the corporate strategies adapted during this time are cautiously tailored to ensure 
that transformation is a highly-ranked priority for the assurance of continued business 
between the public and private sector. Characterizing this time period is a strong sense of 
focus on meeting the objectives as set out in the charter. Below is an examination of how the 
four firms have fared against one another and the targets of the scorecard. The first 
measurement phase as stipulated by the charter was set to take place between 2009 and 
2013, fitting within the timeframe perimeters of this paper. This was thus a crucial period in 
laying down the proper foundation for the effective implementation of the framework. 
 
Table 22: Black ownership percentage by firm and year (30% weighting target according to CSC) 
 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts 31,26 32,4 31,7 31,72 45,47 
WBHO 26,66 22,44 34,98 40,85 48,73 
Group Five 19,55 17,1 21.35 24,8 37,69 
Basil Read 22,81 21,37 28,53 53 50,32 
 
Page | 74  
 
Table 23: Black Female Ownership percentage by firm and year (10% weighting target according to CSC) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts 2,63 2,99 14,39 14,47 
WBHO 11,43 11,15 12,36 14,93 
Group Five 3,35 4,29 8,98 11,6 
Basil Read 2,51 19,31 18,26 11,37 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
For the ownership element, I have used the actual black ownership percentage of each firm 
and not the point allocation. A total percentage of 25% and above for ownership means that 
the company is fully compliant while a black female ownership percentage of 10% and 
above also means that the firm is fully compliant. For the remainder of the elements, only the 
actual points are reported.  
Murray & Roberts and WBHO have over the years participated in large black empowerment 
deals, with the hopes of obtaining larger black ownership in their enterprises. Gradually, the 
magnitude of black shareholders within the two companies has increased exponentially with 
both companies having over 40% of their ownership in black hands in 2014. Explaining the 
‘high’ black ownership of 48.73% in 2014 for WBHO is partly by default as a result of the 
WBHO institutional investors who hold WBHO stock (Ujuh,  2013). The B-BBEE deal 
between the firm and Akani Investment Holdings in 2006 explains the other part, where 
approximately 15% of their shares were transferred to this consortium.  
On the other hand is Murray & Roberts whose tremendous growth in black ownership in 
2014 is explained by the allocation of 648 000 shares to the Letsema Vulindlela Black 
Executives Trust or the Vulindlela Trust”. The Trust aims to give black executives the 
opportunity to become shareholders in the firm, as “an attraction and retention incentive” 
(Murray & Roberts Annual Report, 2013). Beneficiaries of the trust are not only black citizens 
of South Africa but must also be employed on a permanent basis within the group as either 
top, middle or junior managers. On the scorecard, these black managers thus not only 
contributing to the ownership element but are also counted when calculating the score for 
employment equity.    
 
After the failure of the iLama BEE transaction in 2009, Group Five sought to find suitable 
alternative partners. In 2012, a new BEE scheme was made with newly-formed entities, 
namely, the Black Professionals Staff Trust and the Izakhiwo Imfundo Trust who acquired 
11.6% worth of shares from Mvelaphanda that had also announced its intention to dispose of 
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its shares (Group Five Annual Report, 2013). This dip in black ownership in 2011 is 
illustrated in the table above. Without the replacement of Mvelaphanda, Group Five would 
have been without black ownership credentials. Since a ‘once empowered always 
empowered’ principle is not allowed according to the B-BBEE Codes of Good Practice, a 
loss of BEE credentials puts a firm at a disadvantage when attempting to bid for public 
sector work.  
Basil Read concluded another B-BBEE agreement worth R521 million with Sishen Iron Ore 
Company Community Development Trust Investment Holdings (SOIC) in 2012. SOIC was 
established in 2006 during the unbundling of Kumba Resources into two companies; Kumba 
Iron Ore and empowered coal and heavy minerals company, Exxaro.  The transaction 
resulted in SOIC effectively holding 25.1% of the company and moving it up from a level 
three B-BBEE contributor to a level two. The deal boosted Basil Read to its current status of 
53% black ownership, doubling its black ownership level over the five year period. There has 
however been a decline in female ownership within the firm from 19.31% in 2013 to 11.37% 
in 2015, a 7.94% decrease. That stated, when comparing the 2012 black female ownership 
percentages to the 2014 percentage figure, one can observe that indeed for three of the 
firms, this representation has increased by more than 8% over the period, illustrating 
significant progress. 
Table 24: Management Control (10 points target according to CSC) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts42 Non-
compliant 
1.52 0 Unavailable Unavailable 
WBHO 7,13 7,25 6,83 6,8 6,48 
Group Five 6,97 6,62 8,7 5,76 4,42 
Basil Read Unavailable 6.1 7,31 6,6 6,62 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
None of the companies have met the targeted 10 points for black management control as set 
out in the charter, according to Table 24 above. As illustrated, WBHO comes the closest with 
a 2014 total score of 6.48 points, due to its continued relationship with Rainbow Construction 
as well as its maintenance of the three initial black partners, through its black empowerment 
initiative. The table also illustrates that the collapse of the deal between iLima- Mvela with 
Group Five has had a lasting impact as they remain the firm with the lowest score on this 
                                                             
42The Murray & Roberts scorecard for 2010 does not give scores for the remaining six elements, namely, management 
control, employment equity, preferential procurement, skills development, enterprise development and socio-economic 
development. The scorecard indicates the element level instead, which is to be understood using table 3 in chapter 2. For 
the years 2013-2014 reliable certificates from Murray & Roberts were unobtainable.  
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element. In fact, Group Five has seen a 2.55 points drop in black management control from 
2010 to 2014. However the firm claims to be tackling this issue and seeks to implement 
changes to administer effective black management advancement schemes.   
As previously articulated in the discussion about board versus executive management, one 
finds that there is a significant distinction between the two, in that there are fewer black 
individuals on the executive than those on the board. The numbers show that the companies 
have been more successful in attaining black equity (shown in the ownership scores) than 
they have in promoting black people into a position of management. The EE element is more 
illustrative of this point. 
Table 25: Employment Equity (10 points weighting according to CSC) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts Level 8 2.36 3,79 Unavailable Unavailable 
WBHO 5,45 5,75 5,97 4,42 4,9 
Group Five 5,91 9,22 5,67 4,17 3,96 
Basil Read Unavailable 4.12 6,13 6,12 4,04 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
It is under the employment equity element that one receives a better indication of the true 
effects of black empowerment initiatives, specifically the advancement of black people in the 
workplace. Arguably, true transformation is made evident by the results of employment 
equity. As illustrated above, all four companies score relatively low on this element. Although 
one is able to ascertain that all the firms have complied with the statutory and administrative 
requirements of the EE Act, (as failure to do so would have resulted in a zero score for 
employment equity on their scorecard) these low score are demonstrative of the fact that 
massive challenges remain operative in the attempts to advance blacks in any management 
positions.  
Since the EE element essentially measures the advancement of black people in either junior, 
middle or senior management, what these scores indicate is that there has been 
devastatingly slow progress towards advancement over the five year period, despite the fact 
that the construction sector weights this element with lower points than the generic 
scorecard43. More precisely, one finds that that there has instead been a decline in the 
scores achieved by the firms between the years 2011 - 2014. Group Five for instance, 
having achieved a score of 9.22 in 2011, has had their score decline gradually by 
approximately 1.5 points over a three year period to 3.96 points in 2014. On the other hand, 
                                                             
4343 The generic scorecard allocates a 15 points weighting to EE. 
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Murray & Roberts had barely met even half of the required points by 2012, while WBHO, 
which is noted as ‘one of the most transformed companies in the country’ still fell short of 
meeting half the required points by the end of 2014.  
Using the Basil Read B-BBEE Assessment Report of 2014 as a further illustration44, one 
finds that they are scoring the lowest (in terms of points) in the ‘middle management’ 
subcategory of employment equity. According to this report, black employees in the middle 
management category as a percentage of all employees was at 26.26% at Basil Read in 
2014, scoring just over 1.2 points (BEE Verification Agency CC, 2014). This is well below 
their target of 75% black representation at this level of management and below the target of 
40% that was set in the charter. Concerning black employees in the senior management 
category (excluding senior top and other top management) as a percentage of all such 
employees, Basil Read’s target is 60%, while their actual achievement is 25.09%, giving 
them 1.46 points as a contribution towards EE. Lastly, with regards to junior management, 
although they have 43.13% black people at this level, they still fall short of their targeted 
80% and the commitment of achieving 65% of blacks at this level as stipulated in the charter. 
 This assessment report assists in dismantling the scores in an attempt to understand where 
the issues may lie. Although it is illustrative of the fact that Basil Read has failed in fulfilling 
not only its goals, but those agreed upon in the charter, its findings suggest that one of the 
central issues facing the industry is that there are barriers preventing the advancement of 
black people into management positions This then slowS the process for effective 
employment equity.  The sector has vehemently argued that these barriers are attributable to 
greater socio-economic such as skills shortage - particularly the shortage of technically 
strong professionals - which has directly affected their ability to adequately address the 
advancement of black people into managerial positions.  
Table 26: Skills Development (15 points weighting according to CSC) 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
There has been a solid overall improvement in the skills development component, with these 
firms coming very close to meeting the 15% target.  Since this element measures how much 
has been invested in the growth and development of the previously disadvantaged, it is 
                                                             
44 This report was obtained following an interview with Basil Read’s Transformation and Employment Equity Manager.  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts Non-
compliant 
12.31 12,25 Unavailable  Unavailable 
WBHO 10,44 12,79 13,16 13.8 14.4 
Group Five 12,8 14,41 14,66 14,42 14,73 
Basil Read Unavailable 13.56 13,27 12,71 13,94 
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encouraging to see that the firms have led successful programmes.  All four firms have seen 
an average annual point increase of approximately 0.8% as they endeavor to meet the goal. 
WBHO argued in their 2014 annual report that “genuine transformation takes time”, 
elaborating that for transformation to last, in needs adequate time to groom talented 
individuals to take up more senior positions (WBHO Annual Report, 2014). This is a 
sentiment shared across all four firms. All the firms have expanded their bursary and 
learnership programmes, specifically focusing on appealing to black women to take on the 
opportunities provided. The Basil Read assessment report indicates that 83.24% of the 
portion of skills development expenditure was spent on black employees in 2014, while 
Group Five is reported to have spent 90.22% of this expenditure on black employees, hence 
contributing to the score outcome.  
Table 27: Preferential Procurement (20 points weighting according to CSC) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts Level 5 19.11 18,75 Unavailable Unavailable 
WBHO 20 19 20 20 19,36 
Group Five 15,68 18,43 19.02 20 19,1 
Basil Read Unavailable 18,83 19,54 20 19,61 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
Perhaps the most inconsistently interpreted element of the scorecard is preferential 
procurement (Construction Sector Charter, 2006). With its aim being to encourage entities to 
“drive transformation throughout the economy by encouraging procurement only f rom 
suppliers that are compliant with the B-BBEE scorecard” (DTI, 2007), there have been 
unintended consequences due to the ambiguity of what counts in its measurement.  The 
industry has tended to focus narrowly on equity ownership, which has resulted in some 
fronting activities as enterprises scramble to meet this compliance requirement. 
Simultaneously, one finds that industry has also noted that procurement is the most complex 
of the elements due to the lack of availability of suitable black contractors and suppliers in 
the sector. Moreover, there is a rather complex measurement tool that is used to measure 
procurement that has been widely contested, partially resulting in the falling away of 
preferential procurement in the amended codes that were initially released in 2013. 
What one finds in the scorecards of these enterprises is that in 2013, all four firms were able 
to score full points for the preferential procurement element. What this implies is that firms 
are increasingly utilizing black-owned contractors to assist on various projects. Additionally, 
it suggests that these companies have assisted in the growth and development of some of 
these smaller enterprises, which has further improved their enterprise development scores. 
In reality, it is inconclusive whether or not these companies have indeed only worked with 
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suppliers that are holistically compliant with the B-BBEE scorecard (generic or industry 
specific). What is known however is the seriousness in which the industry has taken this 
element of the scorecard as “a lower rating would impair the competitiveness of the 
organisation when bidding for state and municipal tenders, which are evaluated according to 
the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA)” (WBHO, 2013). 
Table 28: Enterprise Development (15 points weighting according to CSC) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts Non-
compliant 
15 15 Unavailable Unavailable 
WBHO 12,53 15 13,62 15 15 
Group Five 15 15 15 15 15 
Basil Read Unavailable 15 15 15 15 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
Table 29: Socio-Economic Development (5 points weighting according to CSC) 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Murray & Roberts Level 1 5 5 Unavailable Unavailable 
WBHO 5 5 5 5 5 
Group Five 5 5 5 5 5 
Basil Read Unavailable 5 5 5 2,31 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
In addressing these three elements which are part of the indirect empowerment pillar, 
evidence suggests that the firms have had a significant impact on the growth of their 
suppliers, as well as strengthened the development of the communities they operate in.  
Enterprise development, as well as CSI (part of the socio-economic development element), 
have been growing, and indeed, all four of the firms have been able to meet the set targets 
consistently for three consecutive years. As arguably the easiest of the elements to meet, 
CSI has been conducted by the enterprises even before the formalization of black 
empowerment policy. Primarily it involves contributing towards projects and registered 
development oriented NGO’s that benefit black people, particularly those in under-resourced 
areas.  
 Basil Read struggled to gain the required points in 2014 for the socio-economic 
development element. During that year, the social, ethics and transformation committee had 
mandated management to review the company CSI policy in the hope that a more focused 
and efficient strategy would be implemented. Thus, the internal redesign of CSI projects had 
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an adverse impact on the 2014 B-BBEE scorecard (Basil Read Annual Report, 2014).  
Group Five won the “Best Sponsor of the Year” award at the 2014 Human Settlement Govan 
Mbeki Awards in recognition for one of their socio-economic development projects, Women’s 
Build (Group Five, 2015). This Department of Human Settlements initiative entails the 
construction of residential units for vulnerable and marginalised groups, particularly women. 
As one of the numerous projects that have contributed to this element in their scorecard, it is 
a project that also overlaps with skills development as the women also participate in the 
construction work done. 
Over the six-year period in which the charter has been operational, one finds that the B-
BBEE status level of each firm has been gradually improving as illustrated in the table below.  
Table 30: Firm B-BBEE Status Level 
Year WBHO Group Five Basil Read Murray & Roberts 
2010 3 3 4 4 
2011 3 2 3 4 
2012 3 2 2 3 
2013 2 2 2 3 
2014 2 2 2 2 
201545 2 2 2 2 
Sources: B-BBEE Scorecards of Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read (2010-2014) 
 
Although all four firms have obtained a level 2 status for two consecutive years, it is Group 
Five that is leading the pack as the most transformed company in the industry according to 
the Mail & Guardian’s list of South Africa’s top ten most empowered companies (Mail & 
Guardian, 2013). With a total B-BBEE score of over 80/100, Group Five has performed well 
in junior and middle management, with the number of black members in those positions 
doubling within five years. Additionally, as previously discussed, the firm has invested 
substantially in general training programmes as well as supported the development of maths 
and science education. Closely behind Group Five is WBHO in the tenth position on the 
same national list (Mail & Guardian, 2013). Similarly, it has also invested in boosting maths 
and science skills, strengthening the pool of candidates from which to recruit. Moreover, 
WBHO has mentored and funded over 10 SME enterprises, broadening its base of 
companies that it can contract for work. 
Following the empirical descriptions above, the section that follows aims to provide a 
comprehensive assessment – which encompasses all three phases - of the common themes 
                                                             
45 The 2015 status level is obtained from company websites. 
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pertaining to B-BBEE and its implementation in the industry. The section concludes by 
summarising findings from a baseline report written by the CSCC, which gives some insight 
into the state of the sector with regards to transformation.  
 
 An Analysis of the Trends during all Three Phases 5.6
 
Across most industries, the first wave of BEE implementation focused largely on equity 
transfer, which led to an influx of BEE transactions that empowered a few elite. The 
construction industry however lagged behind greatly, only beginning to engage really in any 
genuine empowerment or transformation schemes during the second phase, as illustrated by 
the discussion on the four enterprises. Based on this study, the big players in the industry, 
therefore, seemed only to take the transformation agenda seriously after the formalization of 
the B-BBEE Act, which facilitated the reinforcement of black empowerment. Moreover, to 
steer away from being purely circumstantial in the analysis, one finds that it is useful to point 
out certain themes arising from the observations made. There is a pattern that one can 
identify from this discussion, in that there are some shortcomings that are common among 
the four firms during the three phases. Using the three pillars of B-BBEE, one can draw the 
following analysis:  
5.6.1 Direct Empowerment 
 
 During the first phase and early in the second phase, empowerment seems to have 
been too narrow and primarily focused on corporate ownership and control. A 
broader perspective was what was central in the construction charter, widening the 
focus and what could be viewed as ‘empowerment’.   
 During the first two phases, one finds that a limited number of people benefited from 
B-BBEE. Findings, as illustrated in tables 18-21, suggest that it was usually those 
with some political networks. For example, as its first steps towards genuinely 
addressing empowerment, Murray & Roberts pulled in some influential individuals 
such as Saki Macozoma. Therefore, the firm addressed only two elements of the 
transformation agenda, namely ownership and management control. One is, 
therefore, able to argue that the pursuit of diversifying their boards was mostly based 
on an individual’s network reach and political capital, with some black executives 
holding director’s position in a number of other companies. 
 Despite the introduction of the charter with the scorecard, one still finds that most of 
these black shareholders are not taking part in the operations of the business, nor 
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steering its strategic path. Strategic decisions are maintained in the hands of white 
people, although blacks have come to occupy a position on the executive board. 
 Through the deployment of prominent black females as chairs for the top executive46, 
there is a sign that efforts are being made to advance blacks when it comes to direct 
empowerment.  
 
5.6.2 Human Resource Development 
 
Too little attention was paid to the transformation of corporations and the transferal of skills 
during the first two phases. Scores for employment equity and skills development have 
pointed out that none of the construction companies have been able to meet set targets 
under the human resource development pillar. EE remains a challenging element in this 
industry due to the failure to address adequately the culture of an untransformed sector. So 
although these companies are meeting set targets from the Act regarding recruitment, 
promotion, transfer, employee benefits, training and conditions of service, more changes in 
the traditional norms of doing business are needed for more substantial modifications to 
occur. Partially contributing to this is that there has been more emphasis placed on 
transferring control of major corporations to inexperienced black-owned companies or 
consortiums, with the old control structures remaining intact, largely influencing the low 
scores in these two elements. 
 
5.6.3 Indirect Empowerment 
 
All four firms are seen to be performing best under the elements pertaining to this pillar. With 
suppliers and communities as the main beneficiaries of preferential procurement, enterprise 
development and socio-economic development, the performances of the firms is indicative of 
the fact that they have been able to address some of the broader dimensions of B-BBEE 
beyond black ownership. 
 
Lastly, one, therefore, finds that before the enactment of the B-BBEE Act and the sector 
charter, the government was the primary motivator for empowerment related investments, 
strongly encouraging companies to enter into equity relationships with black groups by 
specifying empowerment conditions for state contracts. During that phase, the government 
                                                             
46Group Five become the first company in the top five companies in the sector to have a black female chairperson, followed 
by Murray & Roberts 
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used its buying power to encourage commitments to training and empowerment. Its 
approach to empowerment was ad hoc and without a coherent strategic framework. This 
then led to increases in fronting tactics, rather than buy-in and proper implementation by the 
corporates. During the third phase, significant changes take place due to the establishment 
of an Act and sector charter that was able to articulate better what the state expected of 
industry and the precise actions that would be counted as ‘empowering’.  
 
Additionally, one finds that the scorecard has been structured such that it is a combination of 
both ownership actions as well as ‘soft’ actions that qualify a firm to be B-BBEE compliant. In 
the most difficult elements, specifically those that pertain to the two pillars of human 
resource development and indirect empowerment one finds that scores are not only 
weighted low but that the four firms have scored poorly on these as well.  With over five 
years since the charter agreement was rectified, the absence of momentous change, 
particularly for employment equity has put into question the commitment and dedication of 
the construction sector towards real transformation. Moreover, one might argue that it is 
under the ownership and management elements - as arguably the most visible and widely 
reported elements - that failures of the entire empowerment project lay. That stated one 
must acknowledge that ownership targets have the tendency to overshadow the necessity 
for transformation on a ‘real’ level as more resources have been invested in pursuing 
transformation at that level. This comes at the expense of neglecting other aspects of 
empowerment that have the potential to redress the imbalances created by an oppressive 
past.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the overall conclusions to be drawn from this study are discussed 
in depth in chapter 7. Additionally, as will be shown in the remainder of the analysis, the 
conclusions reached in this paper are closely aligned to the findings of the CSCC on the 
state of transformation in the industry.47 
 
 Chapter Summary  5.7
 
Through systematically going through the various approaches employed by each firm as 
they sought to address black empowerment in post-apartheid South Africa, one can identify 
distinctive trends followed by the firms, particularly during the first two phases. What has 
however been particularly worrisome throughout the last twenty years, is that a majority of 
black board members hold independent, non-executive positions and are therefore not 
                                                             
47 See Appendix D for the summary of the CSCC Report 
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involved in the day-to-day management of the companies. Hence, their role is to provide 
objective judgement, which is independent of management on issues facing the company. 
Although, a photographic illustration of the board members at each firm, shows that the 
composition is unequivocally diverse both regarding race and gender, thus somewhat 
reflecting the demographics of the South African society, the actual decision-making of the 
daily directive of the companies remains with middle-aged white males.  
Nonetheless, what one finds at the end of the third phase specifically, is that evidence and 
analysis are partially in alignment with the initial hypothesis which expresses that the four 
large companies have been highly responsive to B-BBEE pressures, although they had not 
adequately addressed all elements. The next chapter will show that despite a collusion 
scandal that has strained relations between industry and state, there continues to be a drive 
by industry stakeholders to maintain commitments made in the charter, thus better 
supporting this initial hypothesis. Accordingly, this next chapter begins by discussing firm 
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Chapter 6: The strategic reforms of the 
firms: An evaluation  
 
 Introduction  6.1
 
Having discussed in depth how the four firms approached and implemented 
empowerment initiatives over the three phases, it is evident that indeed it was necessary for 
the firms to alter their overall company strategies to continue to operate successfully. 
Moreover, before 1994, South African companies were confined to the domestic market due 
to economic and trade sanctions that were imposed by the international community. The 
South African economy was thus dominated by a few large companies who invested in one 
another, due to their inability to expand abroad (The Economist, 2006). Thus, the changes in 
the political arena which heralded black empowerment as a national goal also offered 
businesses the opportunity to remake themselves and begin competing on a bigger scale. 
In this chapter, I describe the various strategic choices that the four firms have made in their 
efforts to evolve in light of the changes that have taken place in national policy. This chapter 
thus details how these companies have transformed and made distinctive strategic 
decisions, during different phases of the twenty year period (1994-2014).  
 
 An Overview of Dominant Firm Strategies 6.2
 
Changes in firm strategies are partially as a consequence of legislative and political 
changes in that particular context. As previously alluded to, the departure from the apartheid 
state to a democratic country caused anxiety among business owners in the most dominant 
South African sectors, due to the uncertainty of what a new dispensation would bring. As a 
first step to change in the early 1990s, the large conglomerates began to unbundle, selling 
off their non-core assets (The Economist, 2006). Specifically, six large conglomerates 
dominated the South African economy at the time, namely, SA Mutual, Liberty/Standard, 
Sanlam, Anglovaal, Anglo-American and Rembrandt/Volkskas (Southall, 2006). The vision to 
become global firms meant they had to transform themselves from their inward-looking 
strategic focus and hone in on particular markets.  
Thus to compensate for their late arrival on the international scene, as well ensure their 
continuity in the changed South African landscape, South African businesses went on a 
shopping spree. SAB, now known as SABMiller, managed to acquire stakes in state-owned 
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breweries in Eastern Europe, expand operations into six African countries mostly through 
acquisitions, move into China as well as acquire Miller, an American brewer all by the year 
2002 (The Economist, 2006). Such activities of ‘centralisation’ which refers to mergers and 
acquisitions among firms have been rapidly on the rise since. These four companies in the 
construction industry were no different.  
In post-apartheid South Africa, there has been a drastic increase in concentration48 and 
centralisation tendencies across the sector, with numerous large mergers and acquisitions 
having taken place over the last twenty years. Cottle (2014) states that under apartheid, 
approximately 5% of construction companies accounted for 63% of the turnover in the 
industry. However, by 2011, it is approximated that 1.2% of construction companies 
accounted for 64% of total turnover in the industry. Moreover, he makes the assertion that in 
1994, there were 23 industrial building and construction companies listed on the JSE, while 
by 2013 only 12 ‘heavy construction’ companies remained on the domestic stock exchange, 
almost half of the 1994 figure (Cottle, 2014). The changes are as a result of some 
bankruptcies in the sector as well as growth in a number of mergers and acquisitions.   
Centralisation has however been more a means to grow the size of the enterprises, 
expanding their reach and modifying their capabilities. Although the pursuit of mergers and 
acquisitions is a strategic goal of any enterprise, this chapter will examine the strategies that 
have shaped the manner in which the firms ultimately perform.   
 I have found that there have been four dominant strategic approaches utilized by these four 
companies that have periodically reformed the way in which business is conducted.  
Three of these options fall within the construction portion of the enterprise and have been: 
1. To build relationships with the new ruling elites to secure public sector work 
(Strategic Decision 1) 
2. To focus on obtaining contracts from the South African private sector as opposed to 
relying on those from the public sector (Strategic Decision 2) 
 
3. To distance the firm from South Africa and her market and rather expand abroad, 




While fourthly and more broadly: 
                                                             
48 By concentration of capital is meant an increased portion of social wealth concentrated within the company.  
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4. To diversify company operations and service offerings, such that the business does 
not only comprise of construction related activities but includes other closely related 
functions – operationally diversify (Strategic Decision 4) 
 
As will be discussed, these are arguably the four dominant strategic positions taken by these 
firms at various stages over the twenty-year period. It is thus essential to examine at which 
points the companies engaged in these strategies over the three phases and how their 
choices have impacted them.   
To document the key strategic milestones and decisions made by each firm during the 
phases, I have utilized a table for each period that details the critical strategic decision made 
by a particular company at that phase. Moreover, to better illustrate the impact of certain 
strategic decisions, I have employed the assistance of a typology that shows the extent of 
geographical and operational diversification for the four companies. The table illustrates the 
extent of both geographic and operational diversification, with geographical diversification 
split into these three categories: 
 Undiversified – firm is active in local markets only 
 Moderately diversified – company is mostly active in South Africa, with limited cross-
border operations 
 Highly diversified – company is internationally active 
Similarly, the following table also illustrates the extent of operational diversification that is 
split into these three categories: 
 Undiversified/ single service offering 
 Moderately diversified – refers to limited vertical markets 
 Highly diversified – refers to multiple vertical markets 
 By depicting the typology table for each phase, one finds a clear demonstration of the 
movements of a company from one category to another. The table in the third phase 
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Undiversified    




Adapted from Olivier & Root, 2014 
 
One finds that the placement of each firm in the table above will change according to the 
phase discussed. Hence, the typology assists in informing the movements made by each 
company, in so far as diversification is concerned.  
 
 The Strategic Reformations  6.3
 
6.3.1 Phase 1 Strategic Reformations: 1994-2000 
 
Table 32: Strategic Reformations, 1994-2000 
Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions 




1994 -  Loss in political connections and struggle to operate in new markets 
 
Strategic Decision 3: 
1995 - Rapid international expansion across the continent 49 
          
Strategic Decision 1: 
2000 -  Firm begins to make gains in political currency50               
                                                             
49 Having started its international expansion growth path in the early 1990s, the firm had an international turnover of 15.2% 
in 1995. 
 
50 Brian Bruce, the CEO of Murray & Roberts at the time, becomes involved in the formation of the CIDB and forms part of 
the committee responsible for the drafting of the construction charter. 
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Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions 
WBHO 1994 - Growth through acquisitions made to safeguard the company against a change in 
political order 
 
Strategic Decision 1 & 2: 
1995 – Impressively establishes a black empowered construction company in Soweto, 
gaining favour with both the private and public sector 
Group Five 1994 - Brief loss in political connections and struggle to operate in new markets.  
 
Strategic Decision 1 & 2: 
1999 - Focuses on building and maintaining relationships with their dominant customers, 
namely, the South African private sector and government 
Basil Read 1994 - Majority French-owned firm51 at the time with weak political network, but good 
financial results 
 
Strategic Decision 3: 
1998 - Strategically focuses on expanding further South into Africa, with the assistance of 
the Bouygues Group 
 
During the first period, one finds that the commonality among the firms is the uncertainty 
about their positions in a democratic South Africa. With the change in the face of 
government came a sudden lose in political connections. These firms, which were at the 
time heavily reliant on public sector contracts, collectively struggled to operate in the new 
environment under the new regime, which vehemently attempted to the loosen the grip held 
by white capital.  
Additionally, the demise of apartheid afforded South African businesses the opportunity to 
expand their operations into the rest of the continent and the world as a whole. Basil Read, 
Murray & Roberts, as well as WBHO, were thus a part of the first few firms in the sector to 
explore markets beyond South Africa, competing with sophisticated and well-resourced 
European companies. The advantage possessed by other international firms due to their 
                                                             
51 Basil Read was a member of the Bouygues Group at the time. 
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years of experience in and familiarity with those markets proved difficult a hurdle to 
overcome. This first “wave of South African investment into other countries” as remarked by 
Olivier and Root (2014) saw much of the investment made by these companies into 
overseas markets suffer due to market and cultural ignorance.     
This first period is thus marked by a scramble among firms to acquire political capital in 
South Africa while exploring the possibility of operating beyond the Limpopo. The failure 
however of the firms to, properly investigate these new markets was an impediment to their 
development and performance. Tabulated below is their position in the typology. 












Group Five Basil Read 
 
 
Undiversified WBHO   





For the initial part of this period, one finds that Group Five remained a firm that primarily 
operated in South Africa, however from 1999 onwards, one finds that the company began 
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6.3.2 Phase 2 Strategic Reformations: 2001-2009 
 
Table 34: Strategic Reformations, 2001-2009 
Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions  
Murray & Roberts  2001- Marks the beginning of the scramble for a BEE scorecard 
influence.   
 
Strategic Decision 1: 
2008-2009 - Major profit gains due to construction activities linked to 
2010 FIFA World Cup. Continued harnessing of public sector 
relationships.  
 
Strategic Decision 3:  
The firm grows in the Middle East and continues to develop across 
the continent.  
WBHO Strategic Decision 1: 
2001 - Senior executives influential in CIDB and drafting of B-BBEE 
scorecard  
 
Strategic Decision 3:  
Firm continues to focus on securing major acquisitions. Continues to 
rapidly expand internationally52  
Group Five Strategic Decision 1:  
2001 - Gained political leverage through influential networks in the 
board53  
 
Strategic Decision 3: 
2006 - Major expansions into Africa, the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe.  
-Growth in acquisitions54  
 
Strategic Decision 1 & 2: 
2009 - Moves from high geographic diversification towards moderate 
diversification in order to focus on operations in South Africa 
                                                             
52 Acquires some of its competitors such as Capital Africa Steel (Pty) Ltd and Matkovich and Hayes (Pty) Limited in order to 
dominant the Southern African market. 
53 See table n chapter 5 on firm board.  
54 Group Five acquires Quarry Cats. See table 23. 
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Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions  
Basil Read Strategic Decision 1 & 2:  
Firm continues to grow rapidly in size due to acquisitions 
 
2005 - Good political leverage acquired through the empowerment 
transactions55. Makes a move towards becoming a black-owned 
construction company 
 
2009 -  Slowly begins to retract from its operations in overseas 
market to cater for 2010 FIFA World Cup, as well as focus on other 
domestic infrastructure activities  
 
The second period, which sees the formal implementation of black empowerment policy, is 
also one where each of the firms pursues two or more of the strategies simultaneously. At 
the start of the period, Murray & Roberts along with WBHO had some of their executives as 
part of the committees in charge of drafting the sector’s empowerment charter as well as 
setting up the CIDB. Engaging in such activities granted them access to powerful decision-
making networks that would add value to future business endeavours. Therefore, what is 
conspicuous about the early years of this period is the upward surge of B-BBEE deals as 
black (usually politically connected) individuals accept positions on the boards of these 
companies. Hence, although not overtly apparent, such networks have worked in the favour 
of the firms, regarding their adherence to B-BBEE and their access to resourceful 
relationships. Simultaneously, both these companies as well as Group Five continued to 
grow and develop their foothold in other parts of the continent as well as in Australia and the 
Middle East.  
When South Africa won the bid to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup during the latter part of this 
phase, there is a significant shift in strategic focus among the firms. With the general focus 
among the firms primarily being geared towards geographic expansion, the World Cup 
presented numerous domestic opportunities for players in the industry. Projects such as the 
building of stadia, the improvement of rail and road systems, as well as the upgrade of 
airports across the country were made available. These massive infrastructure projects 
would require firms with the experience, expertise and resources to reach completion. What 
one then notices from these companies, particularly Group Five and Basil Read is that they 
become acutely aware of the gains to be made domestically, thus begin to reign in resources 
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to capture a significant portion of the perceived rents. There is thus a strategic ploy to retract 
slightly from offshore operations and instead focus on securing the massive domestic 
projects that would be extremely profitable for ‘winners’.  
Regarding diversification, evidence indicates that all four firms were geographically, 
moderately diversified during this phase as illustrated below. The shared strategic approach 
was to develop operations in the rest of the continent and begin to take captive of those 
markets. This proved to more favorable for the firms than was previously seen.  
















Undiversified    





Moreover, one finds that strategic decision 1 was followed by all four of the firms during this 
period. The necessity to form relationships with the governing elite was thus seen an 
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6.3.3 Phase 3 Strategic Reformations: 2010-2014 
 
Table 36: Strategic Reformations, 2010-2014 
Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions  
Murray & Roberts 2011 - Discovery of collusions linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
 
Strategic Decision 3:  
- Rapid international expansions and operational capability growth.  
 
Strategic Decision 4: 
- Acquires Concor56. Growth in firm operations and capacities. 
- Embarks on a three-year Recovery and Growth Strategic plan to restore 
financial stability  
 
Strategic Decision 3, 2 & 4: 
2014 - International operating platforms accounted for more than 70% of 
revenue and 80% of profit. Massive growth in operations outside of South 
Africa.   
WBHO Strategic Decision 3: 
2011 - Moves to becoming a specialised construction company, thus focuses 
on being the 'top contractor' and remain operationally undiversified 
- Implicated in the construction collusion scandal which further motivates it to 
expand internationally 
 
Strategic Decision 3: 
2012 - Rapidly increasing international expansion as domestic projects 
dwindle due to collusion allegations.  
                                                             
56 With both companies listed on the JSE, the deal was contested and questioned by various players in the industry, who 
saw the transaction as anti-competitive.  Eventually it drew the attention of the Competition Commission. The transaction 
was eventually investigated by the Competition Tribunal which ultimately approved the deal. 
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Firm Key Strategic Milestones and Decisions  
Group Five 2012 -  Negatively impacted by the slow roll out of government's infrastructural 
development programme and outcome of Competition Commission 
 
Strategic Decision 3:  
Grows its operations in other parts of Southern Africa  
Basil Read Continues with Strategic Decision 1: 
2010 - Began to focus on operating primarily in South Africa due to the 
National Infrastructure Plan and its promise for long-term business in the 
sector 
 
Strategic Decision 4: 
2011 - Becomes a highly diversified in its operations 
-Mistrust between sector and state due to the collusion scandal has a 
significant impact on its operations due to its heavy reliance on South African 
based projects. 
 
Strategic Decision 3: 
2012 -Began to rethink strategy to operate primarily in South Africa, thus 
branches out to other parts of the continent. 
 
As illustrated in their strategic trajectories, expansion into the African continent has been a 
shared goal for the four enterprises, as this opportunity has allowed these firms to diversify 
their income streams and generate revenue in foreign currencies. As a part of their 2009-
2014 strategy, Murray & Roberts (Murray & Roberts Annual Report, 2011) state that: “Africa 
has become a new frontier for sourcing natural resources, and the economic benefit will 
support the development of new public and commercial infrastructure”. Likewise, Basil Read 
stated in 2011 that they had established a wider range of operations in other parts of Africa 
while Group Five has been involved in infrastructural development projects in Southern 
Africa. Thus, over time one finds that the strategic approach changes from working towards 
forming relationships with the ruling elite (strategic decision 1) to rapidly expanding beyond 
South Africa (strategic decision 3) particularly during the third period.  
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Undiversified   WBHO 
 





Perhaps the greatest deterrent from planned strategies during the years in this period is the 
sudden outbreak of a collusion scandal that significantly impacted all the main players in the 
industry. Undoubtedly one of the largest post-1994 investments made into the South African 
construction industry were the infrastructure development projects that led up to the 2010 
FIFA World Cup to be hosted in the country.  It is worth re-iterating that the post-apartheid 
state is the construction sector’s biggest single client in the delivery of social and economic 
infrastructure, hence landing projects that were associated with the World Cup would be an 
enormous gain to any construction company. The bidding process for a range of projects 
was thus set to be vicious and highly competitive, however through rigorous investigations 
by the Competition Commission; it was discovered that some of the largest and most 
successful construction companies in South Africa opted to ‘cheat the system’ through 
rampant collusions.   
In an investigation that included other industry leaders besides those discussed in the 
paper57, the commission found that these firms colluded when bidding for tenders, allocating 
tenders among themselves and agreeing on profit margins to be achieved from these bids 
(SA Commercial Prop News, 2013).  With the assistance of Group Five as the self-
proclaimed ‘whistle-blower’ (Group Five Annual Report, 2013)58, the Commission launched 
the Construction Fast Track Settlement Process in February 2011 that resulted in a 
collective administrative penalty of R1.47 billion paid by participating firms59. Some argue 
                                                             
57 Other leading firms charged with collusion are Stefanutti Stocks, Aveng subsidiary Grinaker LTA, Raubex and Wade 
Walker – which is now a subsidiary of Murray & Roberts.  
58 Group Five makes the claim to have taken an ‘industry-leading’ position by taking decisive steps from 2009 to gather all 
necessary information of corruption and anti-competitive behaviour from their employees in an attempt to implement internal 
corrective action. This eventually led to the decision to approach the Commission, providing it  with the information gathered, 
which assisted in allowing the Commission to prosecute the construction industry, collect penalties and fines and eliminate 
the collusive behaviour in the country. Due to their continuous co-operation and provision of evidence of the industry’s 
behaviour, Group Five became the primary leniency candidate.  
59 Specifically, Murray & Roberts was fined R309 046 455, WBHO, R311 288 311 and Basil Read, R94 936 248. Group Five 
did not accept the Commission’s settlement offer in terms of the fast track process.  
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that this was a small price to pay if the Commission is to show that it is serious in curbing 
anti-competitive behaviour that has been endemic in the construction industry for decades. 
Moreover, the role of the CIDB in limiting construction sector cartels was interrogated, with 
the CIDB arguing that its powers need to be extended, such that they can sanction firms that 
may be involved in collusive practices (Centre for Competition, Regulation and Economic 
Development, 2014).  
The initiative by the Competition Commission revealed over 300 instances of bid rigging60. 
However, the settlements reached were on projects concluded after September 2006. One 
thus finds that some of the biggest construction contracts to have been conducted over the 
last twenty years are indeed part of this scandal. Appendix B gives a comprehensive listing 
of some of the largest construction projects to have taken place over the last decade, which 
coincidentally, were discovered to have been part of collusive behaviour. These projects 
which are both private and public sector projects involve all facets of infrastructural 
development, all with contract values above R100 million (Centre for Competition, 
Regulation and Economic Development, 2014). The firms coordinated tenders over different 
projects, with the method of operation being that firms would collude to create the illusion of 
competition by submitting sham bids (“cover pricing”), enabling a fellow conspirator to win a 
tender (SA Commercial Prop News, 2013).  Some of these companies had carved up 
contracts between them through a cartel dubbed “the party”. They colluded, fixed prices, 
exchanged commercially sensitive information and rigged tenders (SA Commercial Prop 
News, 2013). 
The scandal has undoubtedly caused a rift between the sector and the state, clearly 
reflected by the performance of each of the companies as they continue to struggle in 
securing tenders. This has had an impact on profit and revenue streams, exasperated by the 
fact that the roll-out of major projects in government’s R3-trillion infrastructure plan have 
stalled since the announcement was made in 2011. 
The scandal thus caused all these firms, particularly Group Five and Basil Read to re-
strategize as their hopes to be the frontrunners in the National Infrastructure Plan61 had 
become slim. 
Moreover, from the two forms of diversification strategies discussed in this paper, namely 
geographic and operational, one finds that Murray & Roberts is the only firm that currently 
features as highly diversified for both geographical and operational diversification. This 
                                                             
60 See Appendix B 
61 The National Infrastructure Plan was adapted by the South African Government in 2012. The plan aims to transform the 
economic landscape of the country, while simultaneously creating jobs and strengthening the delivery of basic services. 
(South African Government, 2016) 
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strategic approach has been beneficial to the company in that it does not rely solely on its 
construction activities for survival, but is also able to maintain stability when the construction 
sector is not performing well in South Africa.  
 
 Overall findings of firm Strategic Performance 6.4
 
Over the examined 20-year period, Murray & Roberts has remained strategically fixed on 
not only taking the lead on some of the biggest construction projects in the country, but also 
ensuring that its footprint reaches across the continent and even into other parts of the 
world. Its approach has thus been dominated by the shifts it has made towards growing the 
company in size to match up with what is required in capability. Strategically, this has 
translated into the firm continuously expanding both operationally and geographically as it 
looks to the developing world for sustained operations. Moreover, the company has chosen 
to focus more on the extraction of oil and gas, as well as the development of petrochemicals 
and water as opposed to construction as they strive to position themselves as a market 
leader in the African continent. In South Africa, their strategy has also evolved tremendously, 
as the focus has become to target multinational corporates and property developers 
interested in establishing themselves in South Africa, whereas previously the focus had been 
to rely on government work. 
Perhaps what is most conspicuous about WBHO is that they have chosen to remain a ‘pure’ 
construction company, despite exploring other related activities over the years as illustrated 
by the three phases. This strategic decision has arguably made them ‘niche’ in this industry 
as they have gained the reputation of being one of the best quality contractors in the country.  
Their strategies have ranged from attempting to diversify their operations, to settling on 
becoming a construction company with a wide geographical spread. Expansion into various 
other countries, as well as the beneficial relationships it has with other industry stakeholders 
in South Africa has afforded WBHO the ability to focus on primarily being a construction 
company and strategically maintain all factors that enable it to stay safely afloat.  
Similarly, both Group Five and Basil Read moved away from primarily focusing on their 
South African operations and looked towards developing their brands in other parts of the 
continent during this period. The stagnation of the National Infrastructure Plan has greatly 
disappointed both firms, propelling them to move into developing economies. Additionally, 
the tension between industry and state has resulted in a difficult-to-repair relationship, which 
has thrown off the strategy to rely heavily on strong rents-based networks that had 
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previously operated smoothly.  There has consequently been a move by the firms to explore 
work opportunities in South Africa’s private sector.  
Drawing from the strategic decisions made at firm levels, there are a few inferences that one 
can gain about the industry.  
 
Lastly, the extent to which these large construction companies are diversified across the 
countries of Southern Africa is indicated in the table below, where a tick expresses that a 
firm is operational in that country. The relevance of this is that is points out where strategies 
to operate beyond South Africa have been successful, as well as indicates that indeed these 
firms have been able to be profitable in these countries despite challenges faced during the 
first period, where unfamiliarity with these markets almost caused them to fail. 
  




WBHO Group Five Basil Read 
Angola  
   
Botswana     
Lesotho    
 
Malawi  
   





Swaziland     
Zambia     
Zimbabwe     
 Source: Olivier and Root, 2014  
 
Murray & Roberts as the largest contractor of the group operates in all specified countries. 
The other three firms are active in most of these countries while one finds that the countries 
most operated in are Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. There is an overall 
consensus among the firms that the Southern African region is the most promising for 
growth opportunities in the sector, specifically for water, transport, energy as well as mining. 
The movement to expand beyond South Africa has also been exasperated by the conditions 
that exist in the domestic market, where the construction sector is currently in a recessionary 
phase of negative growth. This has resulted in increased competition and lower profit 
margins (Olivier and Root, 2014). Strategically, therefore, the firms are pushing towards 
establishing themselves and solidifying their operations in these African markets. 
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This chapter seeks to summarize the major themes and hypotheses asserted in this 
paper. In conclusion it gives a few recommendations, some directed at the construction 
industry and others on the implementation of B-BBEE as a whole. 
 
 Technical Discussion  7.2
 
In an attempt to answer the main research question of this paper, I have tracked the 
objectives of the study through each of the chapters. Primarily the study objectives were; 
 
 To contextualize BEE and the B-BBEE scorecard in South Africa as an economic 
development tool to be utilized by all sectors in their efforts for transformation. 
 
 To analyse the construction sector and its interaction with BEE, using four firms in 
the sector as a case study to assess progress in attaining the policy objectives of B-
BBEE and the respective B-BBEE charter. 
 
 To evaluate the strategic reformations that the firms have undergone over a twenty 
year period and how they have performed at various points during the period. 
 
To meet these objectives, while addressing the research question, the paper was structured 
as follows: 
Chapter two examined the foundations of BEE, tracing the various narratives of black 
empowerment, as well as detailing the key components of the B-BBEE policy framework. 
Chapter three gave a historical account of the construction sector and the formation of the 
CIDB. Chapter four elaborately discussed the Construction Sector B-BBEE Charter, 
describing the elements embedded in its scorecard in order to usher in a discussion around 
how four construction companies have dealt with requirements set in this charter.  
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Chapter five began with a description of each of the four companies to be discussed. It broke 
down the evaluated period into three phases, systematically examining the efforts made by 
the firms in addressing black empowerment during each phase.  
Lastly, chapter six found that the strategic reforms undertaken at different times by the firms 
were largely dictated by the continuous change in the South African political climate at 
differing times during the twenty year period. Continuing with the usage of three phases over 
the examined time period, the chapter sought to find patterns in the strategic decision 
making made by the firms.  
The study thus aimed to evaluate and examine the impact of BEE in the construction sector 
as well as the strategic changes undergone by players in the industry from 1994-2014, using 
Murray & Roberts, WBHO, Group Five and Basil Read as case studies.  
 
 Main Findings and Observations 7.3
 
Informed by the evidence obtained through this research, the main conclusion is that 
there are inherent limitations to B-BBEE in addressing South Africa’s socio-economic 
challenges, despite the expansive manner in which both the B-BBEE Act and industry 
charters define B-BBEE. Moreover, based on the case study of the four firms, evidence 
suggests that the sector has performed inadequately in its attempts to address 
empowerment through the scorecard as it has failed to reach the targets set in the charter. 
This is due to weaknesses in the performance of these firms in relation to the scorecard. The 
construction sector has thus been able to only partially fulfil its transformation agenda and 
meet some of the objectives set out in its transformation charter. There are however 
variations among the firms on the degree to which they have met set objectives, hence the 
necessity to discuss the outcomes comparatively, as for some criteria, some firms perform 
better than others.  
Evidently from the discussion in the paper, there are three broad elements to the B-BBEE 
Construction Charter, namely, ownership, management and the softer elements of the 
scorecard such as enterprise development. It now becomes useful to discuss the evaluation 
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7.3.1 Ownership  
 
One may conclude that despite a tailored industry charter that specifies indicators for each 
B-BBEE element; many firms in the construction sector (including those discussed in this 
paper) had abbreviated B-BBEE to the selling of equity to a few blacks, particularly during 
the first two phases (1994-2000). This element was perhaps the most widely reported on 
due to the controversies that arose around ‘BEE deals’ and the political networks they 
exposed. 
 
Evidence from the scorecard, as well as the board membership composition of each 
company, indicates that all four of the companies have - at some point during the 20 year 
period -managed to meet the ownership target as set out in the charter. This element of B-
BBEE had been portrayed as the hallmark of empowerment and had been overly 
accentuated at the deficit of other aspects of the black empowerment process, particularly 
during the early years of South Africa’s democracy. White business had often regarded 
empowerment as a political necessity while arguing that major changes in management 
would be detrimental to investment and economic growth. The introduction of a 
multidimensional scorecard was a way in which other aspects of empowerment could be 
identified and addressed, hence one finds that it has been a gradual process for these firms 




Arguably the objective of the B-BBEE charter and the scorecard is that transformation goes 
beyond ownership as was its focus during the late 1990s, towards addressing other aspects 
that can directly affect ordinary black South Africans. The advancement of black people into 
managerial positions in the corporate sector thus become necessary to transform the 
manner in which these corporates operate. Evidence from this study indicates that this is 
where weaknesses are most prevalent; both in the manner in which the construction charter 
is structured and in the resulting low scores. Firstly, the scorecard only allocates 10 points to 
employment equity, whereas the generic scorecard allocates 15 points. Evidence in the 
study further shows that there has indeed been a decline in the scores for both management 
control and employment equity for each of the four firms as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Specifically, areas of weakness are in the advancement of the previously disadvantaged in 
middle and senior management positions. The strategic revolutions of each of the firms have 
thus failed to deal adequately with addressing these elements, although it is here where it is 
worth emphasising that it is the socio-economic challenges such as the lack of skills that are 
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a huge impediment. Although expansive in its outlook, B-BBEE remains restricted in what it 
is able to address.  
 
What is also to be drawn from this is that there are barriers that limit the ability to have 
regulations transform firms. Firms can reduce the volume of business that they do with the 
state, through making strategic choices that lead to diversification procedures (both 
geographic and operational diversification) as a way to limit the impact of B-BBEE 
constraints on their corporate culture and norms. The onus is on the firms in the industry to 
make strategic choices that would improve black empowerment initiatives. However, what is 
seen is that the geographic and operational diversification strategies have been a way to 
limit the impact of B-BBEE regulatory constraints for these firms, as they become less 
dependent on government projects and maintain the status quo when it comes to 
management. 
 
7.3.3 ‘Softer’ Elements 
 
The scores for skills development, enterprise development and socio-economic development 
are good across all four firms, with WBHO and Group Five performing well above the other 
two firms.  As elements that address the broader dimensions of B-BBEE and are arguably 
easier to address as they barely disrupt the operational arrangement of a firm, the scores 
obtained under these elements show off ways in which B-BBEE has been successful. The 
ability for these firms to adequately addressing these elements - which are the majority of 
the elements in the scorecard - is somewhat of an indication that these firms have indeed 
been highly responsive to B-BBEE pressures.  
 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 7.4
 
B-BBEE and its scorecard are multidimensional and seek to simultaneously address a 
multitude of transformation targets. One finds however that the issue with the 
implementation of B-BBEE is that it ignores this multidimensional nature of the charter and 
scorecard, with attention often focused on ownership as the element most often equated 
with the entire empowerment project because of the perception of what empowerment is. 
Thus in answering whether or not firms have adequately addressed B-BBEE objectives and 
how their strategies have evolved since 1994, it was important to look beyond the general 
perception that ownership and management control are the primary indicators of 
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empowerment and recognize that there are broader elements embedded in the charter that 
are also significant indicators. Accordingly, there is undoubtedly a great deal of significance 
in the ownership of the means of production by the previously marginalized black majority, a 
significance that cannot be over-emphasized. The ownership element will thus most certainly 
remain the cornerstone of B-BBEE, however in order to truly transform the construction 
industry, there is arguably a necessity for BEE “to shift from supporting passive shareholding 
to promoting a more active and productive empowerment of black people across South 
Africa’s economy” (DTI, 2012) as articulated by DTI Minister Rob Davies. Simplistically, what 
this means is that in discussing BEE and its impact, it is important to locate the impacts of 
BEE beyond ownership through shareholding, but also begin to seriously ensure that the 
policy is impactful to smaller black companies through encouraging big business to play a 
greater role in their development.  
Particularly looking at the four firms discussed in this paper, one notices that what BEE/B-
BBEE has been able to achieve is a high level of commitment from players in the industry to 
address the grievances that relate to black empowerment. The four firms have - through 
their involvement in the CIDB and other organisations interested in the transformation and 
development of the sector – displayed a willingness to reform the industry such that it is 
representative and inclusive of South Africa’s demographical makeup. Although findings 
from this study show that the firms have failed to transform adequately the demographics 
across all management levels, they have thrived in creating programmes that are geared to 
providing skill and training. These ‘soft’ actions have thus boosted scorecard points, while 
simultaneously making inroads in addressing issues around the development of black 
suppliers. The firms, therefore, need to find means to implement BEE more shrewdly, as, 
purely based on what is stipulated in the charter and the indicators imposed on the 
scorecard, the policy has tremendous potential of transforming the industry, contributing to 
the government’s development agenda.  
Thus, there is value in the ‘softer’ parts of the scorecard and perhaps more gains will be 
realized through the implementation of the revised BEE Codes of Good Practice. For the 
construction sector, in particular, the four companies discussed in this paper, I find that there 
are two recommendations to be made that could assist in addressing empowerment; 
1. As captains of the construction industry, these companies have the responsibility to 
use their high profits to assist further in the development of small black enterprises, 
beyond what is required to meet the 15 points targeted from the charter. The larger 
companies could thus invest in finding innovative ways in which they could bridge the 
“capability gap of emerging companies on a win-win basis” (Qubeka, 2016). 
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Moreover, regarding the construction sector scorecard, clarity on what is measured 
as ‘empowerment’ in the procurement process needs to be addressed.  
2. With regards to employment equity and management control, there needs to be more 
pressure exerted on the industry to address the low levels of black representation at 
all levels of management. The sector needs to be pushed by the CIDB through 
continuous assessment to find ways to develop black talent within the firms.  
 
 Chapter Summary 7.5
 
This chapter is the summit of the study. Herein the major findings and subsidiary 
observations emerging from the study were interrogated. Moreover, one finds that the 
conclusions reached in this paper are largely similar to those reached in a study by the 
CSCC on the state of empowerment and transformation in the industry62. All-in-all, BEE 
implementation in the construction sector has been summed up as inadequate, although the 
impact of BEE on the industry players has been acknowledged and taken seriously by firms 
operating in the industry. 
  
                                                             
62 Please refer to Appendix C for a summary on the findings by the CSCC. 
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Appendix A  
Influential Shapers of the Construction Charter  
 
 
Name Association with the Charter 
and Scorecard 
Other Construction Affiliations 
1. Mike Wylie Co-chairman of the CIDB 
Committee tasked to establish the 
industry’s charter and scorecard 
Former executive chairman of 
WBHO 
2. Brian Bruce Former chairman of the CIDB 
(2001-2007) 
He was the Chairperson of M&R 
from 2000-2011 
3. James Ngobeni Co-chairman of the CIDB 
Committee tasked to establish the 
industry’s charter and scorecard 
Has served on the board of WBHO 
since 2006 
4. Philisiwe Mthethwa (nee 
Buthelezi) 
Chief director of the BEE 
Commission that developed the B-
BBEE strategy, the B-BBEE Act 
and Codes of Good Practice that 
govern the charter and scorecard 
Currently serves as the 
chairperson of the Group Five 
board of directors 
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5. Nonhlanhla Mjoli-Mncube Deputy chairperson of the CIDB 
during the drafting of the charter 
and scorecards 
Serves as a non-executive director 
of WBHO since 2006 
6. Spencer Hodgson  
first CEO of CIDB (2001-2007) 
Seconded to Wits University by 
M&R to assist in their major 
expansion programme 
7. Savannah Maziya Board member of the CIDB Serves as a non-executive director 













List of large Public and Private Sector Collusion Projects: 
2000-2008   
Table 39: Major Public Sector Projects 
Project Year Client Conduct Firms that 
colluded 


































Grinaker LTA and 
Group 5 
Group 5 









JV (Referred to 
















Stadium Tender 1 









Stadium Tender 2 


















Page | 116  
 
Project Year Client Conduct Firms that 
colluded 
Firm that won 
bid 










N1 North, N1 
South and N17 
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Glen 
Lyon/Zandkraal 
















National Route - 
Hilltop to 
Baberton 
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2007 SANRAL Cover 
price 



















Page | 117  
 
Appendix C 
Largest Mergers and Acquisition by the Firms 
 
Table 40: Largest Mergers and Acquisitions by the Firms 
Construction 
Company 
Second Party Year Merger Acquisition Summary 
WBHO 
Simbithi Eco- 
Estate (Pty) Ltd 
2007  
 
WBHO increased its 50% shares in 
Simbithi to 100% by acquiring 
additional 50% shares. On 
completion of the transaction, 
WBHO had sole control of Simbithi. 
Roadspan 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
2010  
 
WBHO acquired an additional 40% 
of the issued share capital of 
Roadspan Holdings.  Post this 
merger, WBHO had 70% 





2006   
Acquires 51% stake in 
Matkovich and Hayes (Pty) Limited, 
a major player 
in the design and construction of 
golf courses in 
Southern Africa. 
Capital Africa 
Steel (Pty) Ltd 
2013  
 
The implementation of the 
transaction resulted in WBHO 




Clough Limited 2003 
 
 
Murray & Roberts acquires 
Australian based oil and gas 
engineering company Clough 




The merger between Murray & 
Roberts and Concor created 
Murray & Roberts Construction. 
Cementation 
Africa 
2004   
Gained approximately 60% of the 
market share of the hard rock 
underground mining construction 
and contracting sectors in Southern 
Africa due to this merger 
 










CH-IV is a boutique engineering 
company, based in the United 
States of America ("US") that was 
acquired by Clough,  a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Murray & 
Roberts for US$5 million 
Group Five 




Cobbler sold the entire issued 
share capital of Quarry Cats (a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Cobbler) to Group Five 
Construction. Quarry Cats (a sand 
and stone supplier) has become a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Group 
Five Construction. 
Basil Read 





Viewed as a strategic 
materials supply opportunity 
Spray Pave 2006 
 
 
Viewed as strategic 
materials supply opportunity 
TWP Holdings 2009 
 
 
Basil Read acquired the entire 


















Basil Read acquires Pretoria-based 
construction group made up of 
Mvela Phanda Construction and its 
two subsidiaries, Contract 
Plumbing and Sanitation and P 
Gerolemou Construction. 
 








2008   
Basil Read acquires all share of 









Findings from the CSCC on the State of Transformation and 
Empowerment in the Construction Sector 
 
 Although there is no industry-wide ‘mega’ scorecard, the baseline report on the state of 
transformation and empowerment in the construction sector written by the CSCC gives some 
insight on the overall performance of the industry. According to the report, that was intended 
to assess the accurate state of the sector from the period June 2009 and June 2013, one of 
the main conclusions was that the construction industry is showing progress towards 
transformation. One of the factors demonstrating this is that over 71 % of the sample drawn 
reflected an upward bias to the overall B-BBEE contributor status (CSCC, 2014). Moreover, 
over 2454 (which is 20.4. % of the commercially active industry population) and 69% of the 
sampled certificates is made up of QSEs and Large Enterprises. Another outcome is that the 
construction sector showed enhanced and significant levels of compliance with the 
construction sector code (CSC). This is illustrated by the increase in the numbers of 
scorecards annually, which has risen by 107% (in 2009 – 2010), by 78% (in 2010 – 2011) 
and by 82% (in 2011-2012). 
 
On large enterprises, (four of which are of concern in this paper) the report shows that at the 
time that the study was conducted, the overall B-BBEE contribution for these enterprises 
showed an average Level 4 contributor status, but none had achieved a level 1.  
Additionally, black women ownership has increased in all sizes of the construction sector 
measured entities over the reporting period, however, results exposed polarization in both 
extremes (either no black ownership or there is 100% black ownership) (CSCC, 2014). 
Further details revealed that over 393 construction measured entities showed less than 10% 
black ownership in 2011. Most of the large entities are hovering around 10 percent 
ownership level which is lower than the 25 percent ownership target. There is therefore little 
participation of black people as owners in large companies as remarked by Mr. Rob Davies, 
Minister of the DTI (DTI, 2014). During the same period, over 211 construction, measured 
entities have shown less than 10% black women ownership and 85 have shown between 
90% - 100% black women ownership. Additionally, there was a decrease in compliance with 
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The results from the baseline report are somewhat demonstrative of the strides made by the 
industry thus far and are in alignment with the outcome of this study. The industry-wide 
trends – much like the evidence from the scorecards of these four companies - have shown 
that if measured using the sector scorecard, B-BBEE has succeeded in meeting some 
transformation targets. The report further argues that when looking holistically at the sector, 
results are skewed by the overwhelming number of construction companies registered in the 
lower grades (grade 1-5). The baseline report, therefore, makes it clear that the overall 
results of the sector’s transformation status are directly attributable to the fact that SMMEs 
make up large and significant numbers of the construction industry. To a great extent, this 
distorts the results. Thus, by investigating a cohort of enterprises, the evidence has indicated 
that the perception that the private sector has been lagging in their commitment to contribute 
proactively to empowerment initiatives is often exaggerated, as firms have managed to do 
well in some elements of the scorecard. As illustrated, a comparison of the various scores 
obtained by each firm over the last six years shows that although there has been an annual 
general improvement, there is much to be done for the firms to at least meet the targets they 
ascribed to on the charter in 2009. This is a point that is also emphasized in the baseline 
report. 
 
 
 
